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Abstract
Electoral control refers to attempts by an election’s organizer (“the chair”) to influ-
ence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The ground-
breaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] on (constructive) control proposes
computational complexity as a means of resisting control attempts: Look for election
systems where the chair’s task in seeking control is itself computationally infeasible.
We introduce and study a method of combining two or more candidate-anonymous
election schemes in such a way that the combined scheme possesses all the resistances
to control (i.e., all the NP-hardnesses of control) possessed by any of its constituents: It
combines their strengths. From this and new resistance constructions, we prove for the
first time that there exists an election scheme that is resistant to all twenty standard
types of electoral control.
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1 Introduction
Elections are a way of, from a collection of voters’ (or agents’) individual preferences over
candidates (or alternatives), selecting a winner (or outcome). The importance of and study
of elections is obviously central in political science, but also spans such fields as economics,
mathematics, operations research, and computer science. Within computer science, the
applications of elections are most prominent in distributed AI, most particularly in the
study of multiagent systems. For example, voting has been concretely proposed as a com-
putational mechanism for planning [3,4] and has also been suggested as an approach to
collaborative filtering [5]. However, voting also has received attention within the study
of systems. After all, many distributed algorithms must start by selecting a leader, and
election techniques have also been proposed to attack the web page rank aggregation prob-
lem and the related issue of lessening the spam level of results from web searches [6,7].
Indeed, in these days of a massive internet with many pages, many surfers, and many
robots, of intracorporate decision-making potentially involving electronic input from many
units/individuals/warehouses/trucks/sources, and more generally of massive computational
settings including many actors, it is easy to note any number of situations in which elections
are natural and in which the number of candidates and/or voters might be massive. For
example, suppose amazon.com were to select a “page of the week” via an election where
the candidates were all its web pages and the voters were all visiting surfers (with prefer-
ences inferred from their page-viewing times or patterns); such an election would have an
enormous number of candidates and voters. All these applications are exciting, but imme-
diately bring to a theoretician’s mind the worry of whether the complexity of implementing
election systems is satisfyingly low and whether the complexity of distorting (controlling or
manipulating) election systems is reassuringly high.
Along these lines, though in a time when the importance of large-scale elections was
less crystal clear than it is today, a remarkable series of papers by Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey,
and Trick [8,9,10,2] pioneered the study of the complexity of the winner, control, and
manipulation problems for election systems (see [11] for a related survey). Of these, the
winner and manipulation problems have since been studied particularly intensely. It is
known, for example, that even for some quite natural, simple-to-state election systems—
such as those of Lewis Carroll [12], Kemeny (see [13]), and Young [14,15]—checking whether
a given candidate wins is complete for the “parallel access to NP” level of the polynomial
hierarchy [16,17,18].
Since the complexity of elections is a topic whose importance has made itself clear, it is
natural to ask whether the standard tools and techniques of complexity-theoretic study exist
in the context of elections. One important technique in complexity is the combination of
problems. For example, for sets in complexity theory, a standard approach to combination
is the join (also known as the disjoint union and as the marked union): A ⊕ B = {0x |
x ∈ A} ∪ {1y | y ∈ B}. Even this simple example is not as innocent as it seems. Though
the join indeed has many nice properties regarding respecting simplicity (e.g., if A ∈ P
and B ∈ P, then A ⊕ B ∈ P) and preserving hardness (e.g., if C ≤pm A or C ≤
p
m B,
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then C ≤pm A ⊕ B), it is known that the join has the quite unexpected ability of lower
complexity within the extended low hierarchy ([19]; that result should probably best be
taken as suggesting that the definition of the extended low hierarchy—back in 1986 [20]—
was itself somewhat unnatural, or at least left itself open to this unusual behavior).
In some sense, our work in this paper can be thought of as simply providing, for elec-
tions, an analog of the join. That is, we will propose a method of combining two (or
more) elections in a way that will maintain desirable simplicity properties (e.g., if all of the
constituent elections have polynomial-time winner algorithms then so will our combined
election) while also inheriting quite aggressively desirable hardness properties (we will show
that any resistance-to-control—in the sense that is standard [2] and that we will provide a
definition of later—possessed by even one of the constituent elections will be possessed by
the combined election). One cannot directly use a join to achieve this, because the join of
two sets modeling elections is not itself an election. Rather, we must find a way of embed-
ding into election specifications—lists of voter preferences over candidates—triggers that
both allow us to embed and switch between all the underlying election systems and to not
have such switching go uncontrollably haywire when faced with electoral distortions such
as adding/deleting/partitioning voters/candidates, since we wish hardness with respect to
control by such mechanisms to be preserved.
We above have phrased this paper’s theme as the development of a way of combining
multiple election systems—and in doing so, have desirable types of simplicity/complexity
inheritance. However, this paper also has in mind a very specific application—both for its
own interest and as a sounding board against which our election hybridization scheme can
be tested. This application is the control of election systems.
In election control, we ask whether an election’s organizer (the chair) can by some
specific type of manipulation of the election’s structure (adding/deleting/partitioning vot-
ers/candidates) cause a specified candidate to be the (unique) winner. As mentioned earlier,
the complexity-theoretic study of control was proposed by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick in
1992 [2]. We will closely follow their model. In this model, the chair is assumed to have
knowledge of the vote that will be cast by each voter,1 and there are ten different types
of control (candidate addition, candidate deletion, voter addition, voter deletion, partition
of candidates, run-off partition of candidates, and partition of voters [2]—and for each of
the three partition cases one can have subelection ties promote or can have subelection ties
eliminate, see [21]).
Though Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s control paper is lovely and powerful, very few
subsequent papers have extended beyond their results. One particular one that has is a
1[2], in this regard, takes the view that all voters vote sincerely, and makes the good point regarding the
chair’s global knowledge that such global knowledge is perhaps not a realistic assumption but rather is a
“conservative” one—that they show that even in the face of an omniscient chair, the control problems for
certain voting systems are intractable. We heartily agree with the latter point, but regarding the former
point mention that one does not need to assume voter sincerity. Rather, their model simply assumes that
the chair knows how each voter will vote, and it is irrelevant whether such votes are or are not sincere—at
least if our model is that the votes are fixed before the chair makes his or her decisions regarding how to
assert control.
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paper of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [21] that asks the same questions for
destructive control, i.e., when the chair’s goal is to preclude a given candidate from being the
(unique) winner. (One might ask if such study is a waste of time, given that any sane chair
would vastly prefer to choose the winner than to just keep some particular hated choice
from being the winner. However, [21] shows that for some standard election systems and
types of control the former problem is intractable yet the latter is in P. That is, spoiling a
candidate’s chances can be easier than outright controlling who wins.)
Of course, the dream case would be to find an election system that has the desirable
property of having a polynomial-time algorithm for evaluating who won, but that also has
the property that for every single one of the twenty standard types of control (namely,
the standard ten types, each for the constructive and destructive cases) it is computation-
ally infeasible (NP-hard) to assert such control. Unfortunately, no system yet has been
proven resistant to all twenty types of control. In fact, given that broad “impossibility” re-
sults exist for niceness of preference aggregation systems (e.g., Arrow’s Theorem [22]) and
for nonmanipulability of election systems (e.g., the Gibbard–Satterthwaite and Duggan–
Schwartz Theorems ([23,24,25], see also [26])), one might even momentarily wonder whether
the “dream case” mentioned above can be proven impossible via proving a theorem of the
following form:
“For no election system whose winner complexity is in P are all twenty types of
control NP-hard.”
However, such a claim is proven impossible by our work: Our hybrid system in fact will allow
us to combine all the resistance types of the underlying elections. And while doing so, it will
preserve the winner-evaluation simplicity of the underlying elections. Thus, in particular,
we conclude that the “dream case” holds: There are election systems—for example, our
hybridization of plurality, Condorcet, and an election system we call Enot-all-one (which will
be defined in Section 3.2)—that are resistant to all twenty types of control (Theorem 3.11).
This paper (in its conference version) was the first to prove any election system to be
resistant to even the ten constructive control types. And it was only in 2008, in the work
of [27], that it was shown that some natural system also had those ten constructive-control
resistances. (The largest resistance count among the twenty standard control types that
has yet been obtained by any work other than that of the present paper—which obtains
all twenty resistances—was obtained by Erde´lyi, Nowak, and Rothe [28], who proved that
a variant of approval voting has seventeen of the twenty resistances. However, to do so
that paper adopts a different model—one in which each voter’s preference consists of both
a strict ordering and an approval vector.) It remains an open issue whether any previously
studied (i.e., “natural”) system has all twenty resistances.
Our hybridization system takes multiple elections and maintains their simplicity while
inheriting each resistance-to-control possessed by any one of its constituents. Thus, it in
effect unions together all their resistances—thus the “broaden” of our title.2 The work most
2We mention that in the quite different setting of election manipulation (which regards not actions by
the chair but rather which regards voters altering their preferences in an attempt to influence who becomes
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closely related to that of this paper is the constructive control-defining work of Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [2], the destructive control-defining work of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaan-
dra, and Rothe [21], and the control studies of Erde´lyi, Nowak, and Rothe [31,28], Fal-
iszewski et al. [32,27], and Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [33]. Work on bribery is
related to this paper, in the sense that bribery can be viewed as sharing aspects of both
manipulation and control [34,35]. Of course, all the classical [8,9,10] and recent papers
(of which we particularly point out, for its broad framework and generality, the work of
Spakowski and Vogel [36]) on the complexity of election problems share this paper’s goal of
better understanding the relationship between complexity and elections.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the needed definitions regarding
elections and control, defines and discusses our hybridization system, and defines and dis-
cusses the notions of inheritance that we will use to measure whether or not hybridization
maintains or destroys desirable properties. Section 3 discusses the behavior of our hybrid
system with respect to inheriting resistance (NP-hardness) to control, and also discusses
the related notion of inheritance of susceptibility. Then it discusses the inheritances and
noninheritances of our hybrid system with respect to vulnerability (having P-time control
algorithms), and also discusses the related notion of immunity. Appendix A presents some
proofs deferred from Section 3.4.
2 Elections, Control, Hybridization, and Inheritance: Defi-
nitions and Discussion
2.1 Elections
An election system (or election rule or election scheme or voting system) E is simply a map-
ping from (finite though arbitrary-sized) sets (actually, mathematically, they are multisets)
V of votes (each a preference order—strict, transitive, and complete—over a finite candidate
the winner) [9], there has been some work by Conitzer and Sandholm [29] regarding making manipulation
hard, even for systems where it is not hard, by changing the system by going to a two-stage election in which
a single elimination pre-round is added, and Elkind and Lipmaa [30] have generalized this to a sequence
of elimination rounds conducted under some system(s) followed by an election under some other system.
Though the latter paper like this paper uses the term “hybrid,” the domains differ sharply and the methods
of election combination are nearly opposite: Our approach (in order to broaden resistance to control) embeds
the election systems in parallel and theirs (in order to fight manipulation) strings them out in sequence.
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set3) to (possibly empty, possibly nonstrict) subsets of the candidates.4 All votes in a given
V are over the same candidate set, but different V ’s of course can be over different (finite)
candidate sets. Each candidate that for a given set of votes is in E ’s output is said to be a
winner. If for a given input E outputs a set of cardinality one, that candidate is said to be
the unique winner. Election control focuses on making candidates be unique winners and
on precluding them from being unique winners.
Throughout this paper, a voter’s preference order will be exactly that: a tie-free linear
order over the candidates. And we will discuss and hybridize only election systems based
on preference orders.5 Following a convention that dates at least back to the early 1980s,
we often will refer to the elements of V as “voters” rather than “votes.”
We now define two common election systems, plurality voting and Condorcet voting. In
plurality voting, the winners are the candidates who are ranked first the most. In Condorcet
voting, the winners are all candidates (note: there can be at most one and there might be
zero) who strictly beat each other candidate in head-on-head majority-rule elections (i.e.,
get strictly more than half the votes in each such election). For widely used systems such
3A subtle point is that, to be very careful, we should mention that though we above speak of E as if its
input was just the votes (over a candidate set), to be utterly formal we tacitly view the candidate set itself
as being also an input. It might be natural to think that taking such a view is unneeded, since we can infer
the candidate set from the votes. However, that reasoning fails—though this boundary case seems to have
been overlooked in some earlier work—if the cardinality of the vote set is zero. For example, the election
rule under which all candidates always win very fundamentally needs to, when there are zero voters, know
what the candidate set is, so it can know what winner names to output. Nonetheless, we will be careful in
defining our hybrid scheme not to take unfair advantage of the fact that C is part of our input, formally
speaking.
In the context of subelections we will sometimes speak of elections (C, V ) where C is a strict subset of the
candidates that occur in V . In such cases, we view the preference orders in V as being restricted to C.
4As is typical in papers on the complexity of voting, we study the case not of elections (actually, full-
blown social choice functions) that output a full preference order (except with ties allowed), but rather we
study the bare-bones but in practice very central case of elections where the focus is purely on selecting the
winners.
As a somewhat arcane side comment, we mention that though many earlier papers imply that the latter is
a special case of the former, this is not strictly true unless one restricts oneself to election rules always having
at least one winner. Without that restriction, the problem is that the trick of declaring the top equality
group of an output “preference order except with ties allowed” to be the winners breaks down since it has
no way to declare that there are no winners (note that having all be equal would make them all winners; of
course, we could when there are three or more candidates use, for example, c > b > a to code both c > b > a
and c > a > b, since they both have the same winner set, “{c},” and we would thus free up c > a > b to
denote “special case: no one wins”. . . but this is such an exceedingly unnatural approach that we would not
want to say that it shows that winner/loser elections with three or more candidates are a “special case” of
general social choice functions).
5Thus we do not directly discuss systems such as approval voting that take very different inputs: lists
tagging each candidate as approved or not approved. However, we mention in passing that our hybridization
approach works perfectly well for such systems and for them yields—if one codes the input as candidate
lists tagged with an approval/disapproval bit—the same main results: The hybrid inherits all the resistance
types of its constituent systems and yet has a polynomial-time winner algorithm if they all do. Thus the only
reason we throughout this paper fix our systems as having preference orders as inputs is that it wouldn’t
even be particularly meaningful to try to hybridize together systems with conflicting input types, and by
focusing just on preference-order-based preferences we prevent that from ever happening.
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as plurality voting, we will write plurality rather than Eplurality.
We say that an election system E is candidate-anonymous if for every pair of sets of
votes V and V ′, ‖V ‖ = ‖V ′‖, such that V ′ can be created from V by applying some one-to-
one mapping h from the candidate names in V onto new candidate names in V ′ (e.g., each
instance of “George” in V is mapped by h to “John” in V ′ and each instance of “John” in
V is mapped by h to “Hillary” in V ′ and each instance of “Ralph” in V is mapped by h to
“Ralph” in V ′) it holds that
E(V ′) = {c′ | (∃c ∈ E(V )) [h(c) = c′]}.
Informally put, candidate-anonymity says that the strings we may use to name the candi-
dates are all created equal. Note that most natural systems are candidate-anonymous. For
example, both the election systems mentioned immediately above—plurality-rule elections
and the election system of Condorcet—are candidate-anonymous.
We mention that everywhere in this paper where we use assumptions of candidate-
anonymity (namely, in most of our inheritance results), our results would even hold under
the far weaker assumption of candidate-affine-invariance, defined as follows.6 We say that
an election system E is candidate-affine-invariant if for every pair of sets of votes V and V ′
such that V ′ can be created from V by applying some mapping h of the form h(c) = k1c+k2,
k1 ∈ N
+, k2 ∈ N, from the candidate names in V to the new candidate names in V
′, it
holds that E(V ′) = {c′ | (∃c ∈ E(V )) [h(c) = c′]}. Note that when we treat candidate
names as natural numbers (both above, and also later in defining our hybrid scheme), we
are implicitly using the standard bijection between strings from Σ∗ (potential candidate
names) and natural numbers, namely the ith string in lexicographical order is associated
with the natural number i−1. Though as just mentioned candidate-affine-invariance suffices
for all our results, we nonetheless use candidate-anonymity in our definitions and statements
as candidate-anonymity seems a more natural notion. To avoid any confusion, we stress
that k1 is limited to N
+ and k2 is limited to N, and so we are using the term “affine”
somewhat improperly.
Finally, we mention that though related in flavor, candidate-anonymity is not identi-
cal to the political science notion of (candidate-)neutrality (see [22]), which is defined by
6One should be a bit careful here. In many such cases, our existing proof already handles the case
of candidate-affine-invariance, since the existing proof uses a transform of the form used in defining (as
we are about to do in the main text) candidate-affine-invariance: h(c) = k1c + k2, k1 ∈ N
+, k2 ∈ N.
However, in some cases, rethinking the result in terms of candidate-affine-invariance requires revising the
proof, most typically to either explicitly invoke the type of mapping used in defining candidate-affine-
invariance, or to change the words “candidate-anonymous”/“candidate-anonymity” to the words “candidate-
affine-invariant”/“candidate-affine-invariance” in some places, or to keep in mind that when considering this
change one also should view all the underlying definitions—such as inheritance—as being framed in terms
of candidate-affine-invariance (though, of course, in any case candidate-anonymity implies candidate-affine-
invariance, so the remapping of the definition of inheritance is not truly needed when the inheritance appears
only in the hypothesis of a particular theorem). As a specific example, note that to make Theorem 3.12’s
proof work for the case of candidate-affine-invariance, one would have to create that proof’s set D from that
proof’s set C not by just using any mapping that ensures that D and C are disjoint, but rather by choosing
a mapping that achieves disjointness and that also has the form h(c) = k1c+ k2, k1 ∈ N
+, k2 ∈ N; this can
easily be done, e.g., by taking k1 = 1 and k2 sufficiently large.
7
saying that permuting the names of an election’s candidates does not affect the outcome.7
Candidate-anonymity implies neutrality but the converse does not in general hold as shown
by the following example. The election system that ignores all the votes and declares all
candidates winners if all candidates’ names viewed as strings are of the same length and
otherwise declares no candidates winners is neutral but not candidate-anonymous (“Bob”
and “Joy” both win in the two-candidate election with (irrelevant) vote set V but changing
“Bob” to “Bobby” changes the outcome). Candidate-anonymity, with its view of names as
being coded as arbitrary strings, is a more “computer science”-y notion—focusing on actual
codings, since sets are defined via (and machines accept) actual coded input strings.
2.2 Our Hybridization Scheme: Definition and Discussion
We now define our basic hybridization scheme, hybrid. To avoid long discussions about what
properties of what we will call the “default” election rule are not needed or not inherited,
we will first define a more general scheme, hybrid-base, and then will in defining hybrid
simply fix the “default” election rule to be the same as the last regular constituent election
rule. By doing so, our results will be stated in slightly less general ways than what actually
holds, but the theorem statements will be simpler and clearer.
Definition 2.1 Let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1, and Edefault be election rules that take as input voters’
preference orders. We define hybrid-base(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1, Edefault) to be the election scheme
that does the following:
If there is at least one candidate and all candidate names8 are congruent, mod-
ulo k, to i (for some i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) then use election rule Ei. Otherwise use
Edefault.
We define hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) to be the system hybrid-base(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1, Ek−1). We
say that E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 are the constituents of hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1).
Having defined our system there is much to discuss. Why did we choose this system?
What are its properties? What other approaches did we choose not to use, and why? What
aspects of the input is our method for switching between election systems using, and what
aspects is it choosing not to exploit, and what are the costs associated with our choices?
As to the properties of this system, Section 3 is devoted to that, but most crucially we
will see that this system possesses every resistance-to-control property possessed by even
one of its constituents. And this will hold essentially due to the fact that hybrid is a close
analog of the effect of a join: It splices the constituents together in such a way that key
7Arrow [22] cites the origin of this notion to a paper by Guilbaud [37] and defines the Condition of Neu-
trality as follows: “Let T (x) be a one-one transformation of the set of alternatives into itself which preserves
all individual orderings. Let the environment S be transformed into S′ by the transformation T . Then the
social choice from S, C(S), is transformed by T into the social choice, C(S′), from the environment S′.”
8Viewed as natural numbers via the standard bijection between Σ∗ and N mentioned in the discussion of
candidate-anonymity.
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questions about the constituent systems can easily be many-one polynomial-time reduced
(≤pm-reduced or reduced, for short) to questions about their hybrid.9
As to why we chose this particular system, note that hybrid “switches” between con-
stituent systems via wildly redundant information. This will let us keep deletions/partitions
of voters/candidates from causing a switch between the underlying systems (if the starting
state routed us to a nondefault case). Note that some other approaches that one might
take are more sensitive to deletions. For example, suppose we wanted to hybridize just
two election systems and decided to do so by using the first election system exactly if the
first voter’s most disliked candidate’s name is lexicographically less than the first voter’s
second-most-disliked candidate’s name. Note that if, as part of our control problem, that
voter is deleted, that might suddenly change the system to which the problem is routed.
Or, as another example, if we use the modulo k value of the name of the lexicographically
smallest candidate to control switching between the k election systems, then that hybridiza-
tion approach would be very sensitive to jumping between systems if, as part of our control
problem, that candidate is deleted. These examples give some idea of why we chose the
approach we did, though admittedly even it can in some cases be nudged into jumping
between systems—but at least this happens in very limited, very crisply delineated cases
and in ways that we will generally be able to appropriately handle.
Finally, we come to what we allow ourselves to use to control the switching, what we
choose not to use, and what price we pay for our choices. What we use (as is allowed in
the [2] model) are the candidates’ names and only the candidates’ names. We use absolutely
nothing else to control switching between elections. We do not use voters’ names. Indeed, in
the [2] model that we follow, voters (unlike candidates) do not even have names. But since
the votes are input as a list, their ordering itself could be used to pass bits of information—
e.g., we could look at whether the first vote in the list viewed as a string is lexicographically
less than the last vote in the list viewed as a string. We in no way “cheat” by exploiting such
input-order information, either for the votes or for the list of candidates (as per Footnote 3,
and as per [2], formally the candidate set is passed in separately to cover a certain boundary
case). Our “switch” is based purely on candidates’ names and just candidates’ names. This
also points to the price we pay for this choice: Even when all its constituent elections are
candidate-anonymous, hybrid may not possess candidate-anonymity.
2.3 Types of Constructive and Destructive Control
Constructive control problems ask whether a certain class of actions by the election’s chair
can make a specified candidate the election’s unique winner. Constructive control was first
defined and studied by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2]. Destructive control problems ask
whether a certain class of actions by the election’s chair can make a specified candidate
fail to be a unique winner of the election. Destructive control was defined and studied by
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [38,21], and in the different context of electoral
9We mention in passing that this is one of the reasons we focus on hybrid rather than hybrid-base.
It is possible to construct artificial systems for which even the winner problem for a system ED does not
≤pm-reduce to hybrid-base(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1, ED).
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manipulation destruction was introduced even earlier by Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm [39,
40,41].
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s [2] groundbreaking paper defined seven types of electoral
control. Among those seven, three are partition problems for which there are two different
natural approaches to handling ties in subelections (see [21] which introduced these tie-
handling models for this context): eliminating tied subelection winners (the “TE” model)
or promoting tied subelection winners (the “TP” model). Thus, there are (7−3)+2 ·3 = 10
different standard types of constructive control, and there are essentially the same ten types
of destructive control.
Since it is exceedingly important to not use a slightly different problem statement than
earlier work whose results we will be drawing on, we will state the seven standard construc-
tive control types (which become ten with the three partition control types each having
both “TE” and “TP” versions) and their destructive analogs using word-for-word defini-
tions from [21,38,42], which themselves are based closely and often identically on [2] (see
the discussion in [21]).
Though V , the set of votes, is conceptually a multiset as in the previous related work,
we take the view that the votes are input as a list (“the ballots”), and in particular are
not directly input as a multiset in which cardinalities are input in binary (though we will
mention later that our main result about hybrid holds also in that quite different model).
Control by Adding Candidates
As is common, we state our decision problems as “Given” instances, and a related Yes/No
question. The language in each case is the set of all instances for which the answer is
Yes. (So we are studying the complexity of recognizing the set of instances on which
control is possible.) Since in each control scenario, the “Given” instance is identical for the
constructive and the destructive case, we state it just once and then state the corresponding
two questions, one for constructive and one for destructive control.
Given: A set C of qualified candidates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set D of
possible spoiler candidates, and a set V of voters with preferences over C ∪D.
Question (constructive): Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into the
election would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into the
election would assure that c is not the unique winner?
This problem captures whether adding candidates can make a candidate the victor or can
block such.10
10The notion, as we have stated it, is the notion proposed by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] as “Adding
Candidates.” However, [32,27] recently defined and highly commended an eleventh control type—adding a
number of candidates for the “limited” case where a bound on the maximum number of candidates that
can be legally added is itself part of the input. We mention that the techniques of the current paper apply
10
Control by Deleting Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters, and a
positive integer k < ‖C‖.
Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C whose disqualifica-
tion would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C−{c} whose disqual-
ification would assure that c is not the unique winner?
This problem models vote suppression. (The choice to have a k for candidate deletion
and voter addition/deletion but not for candidate addition is somewhat arbitrary, but was
a decision made explicitly by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2], and for consistency and
comparison purposes, we follow their choice.) Note that deleting the distinguished candidate
c in the destructive case, which would trivialize the problem, is not allowed.
Control by Partition of Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is the
unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in the sub-
election (C1, V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to face the candidates
in C2 (with voter set V )?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is not the
unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in the sub-
election (C1, V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to face the candidates
in C2 (with voter set V )?
Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is the
unique winner of the election in which those candidates surviving (with respect to the
tie-handling rule) subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have a run-off with voter set V ?
perfectly well to that case too, and so in particular the techniques of the present paper easily yield that there
is a hybrid election system that is resistant to all twenty-two control types (the twenty standard ones plus
the constructive and destructive limited-candidate-addition cases). The reason we can make this comment is
that there are systems resistant to constructive limited-candidate-addition and there are systems resistant to
destructive limited-candidate-addition; for example, plurality has both these properties (see the discussion
in the caption of Table 1 of [43]).
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Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is not the
unique winner of the election in which those candidates surviving (with respect to the
tie-handling rule) subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have a run-off with voter set V ?
These two problems model two natural ways of conducting partitioned elections: either via
an elimination pre-round involving some candidates or as a run-off structure (3-node tree).
Control by Adding Voters
Given: A set of candidates C and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of registered
voters, an additional setW of yet unregistered voters (both V andW have preferences
over C), and a positive integer k ≤ ‖W‖.
Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from W whose registration
would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters from W whose registration
would assure that c is not the unique winner?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters, and a
positive integer k ≤ ‖V ‖.
Question (constructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose disenfranchise-
ment would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose disenfranchisement
would assure that c is not the unique winner?
Control by Partition of Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that c is the
unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the survivors of (C, V1)
and (C, V2) run against each other with voter set V ?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that c is not the
unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the survivors of (C, V1)
and (C, V2) run against each other with voter set V ?
These three problems model control by addition, deletion, and partition of voters.
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2.4 Immunity, Susceptibility, Vulnerability, and Resistance
Again, to allow consistency with earlier papers and their results, we take this definition from
[21,38,42], with the important exception regarding resistance discussed below Definition 2.2.
It is worth noting that immunity and susceptibility both are “directional” (can we change
this?) but that vulnerability and resistance are, in contrast, outcome-oriented (can we end
up with this happening?) and complexity-focused.
Definition 2.2 We say that a voting system is immune to control in a given model of
control (e.g., “destructive control via adding candidates”) if the model regards constructive
control and it is never possible for the chair to by using his/her allowed model of control
change a given candidate from being not a unique winner to being the unique winner, or the
model regards destructive control and it is never possible for the chair to by using his/her
allowed model of control change a given candidate from being the unique winner to not being
a unique winner. If a system is not immune to a type of control, it is said to be susceptible
to that type of control.
A voting system is said to be (computationally) vulnerable to control if it is susceptible
to control and the corresponding language problem is computationally easy (i.e., solvable in
polynomial time).
A voting system is said to be resistant to control if it is susceptible to control but the
corresponding language problem is computationally hard (i.e., NP-hard).
We have diverged from all previous papers by defining resistance as meaning NP-
hardness (i.e., NP-≤pm-hardness) rather than NP-completeness (i.e., NP-≤
p
m-completeness).
Though revising existing notions always holds the danger of sowing confusion, in this partic-
ular case the redefinition is compelling. Under the [2] “NP-complete” definition, a problem
whose control issue is NP-complete is resistant but a problem whose control issue is NEEEE-
complete—or even undecidable—would actually be provably not resistant. This is totally
at odds with the intent of the notion of being resistant to control. In [2], all their prob-
lems happened to be not just NP-hard but also NP-complete, but that certainly is not a
reason to define a “difficulty level” concept in terms of a notion—NP-completeness—that
encapsulates both a difficulty notion (NP-hardness) and a simplicity notion (membership
in NP).
Thus we redefine resistance to mean NP-hardness. This redefinition was already praised,
though not adopted, in [21, Footnote 9]. Note that all existing resistance results (under the
old definition) imply resistance under the new definition—which should lessen the potential
for confusion.
As a final comment on this redefinition, we above casually mentioned that control prob-
lems might in difficulty exceed NP-completeness. But can that really occur in truly natural
systems? The answer is yes. In particular, note that the unique winner problem for any
election system (with preference orders) reduces to its constructive control by adding can-
didates problem (by setting the spoiler candidate set D to ∅), to its constructive control
by deleting candidates problem (by setting the deletion limit k to 0), to its constructive
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control by adding voters problem (by setting the addition bound k to 0), and to its construc-
tive control by deleting voters problem (by setting the deletion limit k to 0). Thus every
system with a hard winner problem has four control problems that are at least as hard.
Note that Dodgson [12], Kemeny [13], and Young [14,15] elections are much-studied natural
systems whose winner problem (but defined in terms of “winner,” not “unique winner”) is
known—respectively due to [16], [18], and [17]—to be complete for the Θp2 level [44,45] of
the polynomial hierarchy (a level that contains NP, coNP, and the boolean hierarchy [46],
so if even one Θp2-hard set is NP-complete then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to NP).
From this and the above comments, it follows that the four mentioned control problems are
Θp2-hard for each of Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young elections when the control problems are
altered to speak of “winner” rather than “unique winner” (this alteration is not the model
of this paper or any previous paper on control). However, we observe by close inspection
that in all of [16,18,17], the proofs that establish Θp2-hardness for the Dodgson, Kemeny,
and Young election winner problems can be modified to show that their unique winner
problems are also Θp2-hard.
11 Thus, we may state the following.
11As mentioned above, the winner problems for Dodgson [12], Kemeny [13], and Young [14,15] elections
are known—respectively due to [16], [18], and [17]—to be complete for Θp2, the complexity class capturing
“parallel access to NP.” In this footnote, we show the analogous results for the unique winner problems.
(See the above papers and [8] for the definitions of these three election systems and of Dodgson score.)
Theorem 2.3 The unique winner problem for Dodgson elections is Θp2-complete. The unique winner prob-
lem for Kemeny elections is Θp2-complete. The unique winner problem for Young elections is Θ
p
2-complete.
Proof. Θp2-completeness of the winner problem for Dodgson elections was shown in [16]. The Θ
p
2 upper
bound is easy to show, and the same argument can be used to show a Θp2 upper bound for the unique winner
problem. It remains to show that the unique winner problem for Dodgson elections is Θp2-hard. Θ
p
2-hardness
of the winner problem for Dodgson elections was shown by a reduction from the Θp2-hard problem Two-
Election Ranking (2ER, for short) [16]: Given two Dodgson triples (C, c, V ) and (D, d,W ), where both ‖V ‖
and ‖W ‖ are odd and c 6= d, is the Dodgson score of c in (C, V ) less than or equal to the Dodgson score of
d in (D,W )? A Dodgson triple (C, c, V ) is an election (C, V ) with a designated candidate c ∈ C.
The reduction from 2ER to the winner problem for Dodgson elections [16] has the property that if an
instance I = ((C, c, V ), (D, d,W )) of 2ER is mapped to the Dodgson triple ( bC, c, bV ), then c and d are winners
of ( bC, bV ) if I is in 2ER, and d is the unique winner of ( bC, bV ) if I is not in 2ER. It follows that I is in 2ER
if and only if d is not the unique Dodgson winner of ( bC, bV ). Thus the complement of the unique winner
problem for Dodgson elections is Θp2-hard. Since Θ
p
2 is closed under complement, the unique winner problem
for Dodgson elections is also Θp2-hard.
Θp2-completeness of the winner problem for Kemeny elections was shown in [18]. The Θ
p
2 upper bound is
easy to show, and the same argument can be used to show a Θp2 upper bound for the unique winner problem.
It remains to show that the unique winner problem for Kemeny elections is Θp2-hard. Θ
p
2-hardness of the
winner problem for Kemeny elections was shown by a reduction from the Θp2-hard problem Feedback Arc
Set Member [18]: Given an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph G and a vertex c of G, does there exist
a minimum-size feedback arc set of G that contains all arcs entering c? A feedback arc set of G is a set of
arcs that contains at least one arc from every cycle in G.
The reduction from Feedback Arc Set Member to the winner problem for Kemeny elections [18, Lemma
4.2] works as follows. There is a polynomial-time computable function g such that for all irreflexive and
antisymmetric digraphs G, g(G) is an election whose candidates are the vertices of G and such that for all
vertices c of G, (G, c) is in Feedback Arc Set Member if and only if c is a Kemeny winner of election g(G).
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Theorem 2.4 For each of Dodgson elections, Kemeny elections, and Young elections, the
following control problems are Θp2-hard: constructive control by adding candidates, construc-
tive control by deleting candidates, constructive control by adding voters, and constructive
control by deleting voters.
An anonymous referee commented that even polynomial-time algorithms can be expen-
sive to run on sufficiently large inputs. We mention that though the comment is correct,
almost any would-be controller would probably much prefer that challenge, solving a P
problem on large inputs, to the challenge our results give him/her, namely, solving an NP-
complete problem on large inputs. We also mention that since the hybrid scheme is designed
so as to inherit resistances from the underlying schemes, if a hybrid requires extreme ratios
between the number of candidates and the number of voters to display asymptotic hardness,
that is purely due to inheriting that from the underlying systems. Indeed, if anything the
hybrid is less likely to show that behavior since, informally put, if even one of the underlying
systems achieves asymptotic hardness even away from extreme ratios between the number
of candidates and the number of voters, then their hybrid will also.
2.5 Inheritance
We will be centrally concerned with the extent to which hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) inherits
the properties of its constituents. To do so, we formally define our notions of inheritance
We turn this into a reduction from the complement of Feedback Arc Set Member to the unique winner
problem for Kemeny elections as follows: Given an input instance (G, c) of Feedback Arc Set Member, add
a new vertex d to G and add arcs from d to every vertex in V (G) − {c}. Note that no minimum-size
feedback arc set of bG contains an arc starting from d (since these arcs are not part of a cycle), and so for all
c′ ∈ V (G) − {c}, ( bG, c′) is not in Feedback Arc Set Member. Also note that ( bG, d) is trivially in Feedback
Arc Set Member since there are no arcs entering d.
Now consider election g( bG). Recall that the candidates of g( bG) are the vertices of bG and that for all
vertices c′ in bG, ( bG, c′) is in Feedback Arc Set Member if and only if c′ is a Kemeny winner of election g( bG).
From the observations above, it follows immediately that ( bG, c) is in Feedback Arc Set Member if and only
if d is not the unique Kemeny winner of election g( bG). Since (G, c) is in Feedback Arc Set Member if and
only if ( bG, c) is in Feedback Arc Set Member, we have obtained a polynomial-time reduction from Feedback
Arc Set Member to the complement of the unique winner problem for Kemeny elections. Since Θp2 is closed
under complement, this proves that the unique winner problem for Kemeny elections is Θp2-hard.
Θp2-completeness of the winner problem for Young elections was shown in [17]. The Θ
p
2 upper bound is
easy to show, and the same argument can be used to show a Θp2 upper bound for the unique winner problem.
Θp2-hardness of the winner problem for Young elections was shown as Theorem 2.5 in [17] via a reduction
from the Θp2-complete problem Maximum Set Packing Compare (MSPC, for short) [17]: Given two sets, B1
and B2, and two collections of sets, S1 and S2, where each S ∈ Si is a nonempty, finite subset of Bi, is it
the case that κ(S1) ≥ κ(S2)? Here, κ(Si) denotes the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sets in Si.
The proofs of Theorems 2.3 and 2.5 in [17] show how to construct from a given MSPC instance I =
(B1, B2,S1,S2) an election (C, V ) with two designated candidates, c and d, such that (a) if κ(S1) ≥ κ(S2)
then c and d are Young winners of (C, V ), and (b) if κ(S2) > κ(S1) then d is the unique Young winner
of (C,V ). It follows that I is in MSPC if and only if d is not the unique Young winner of (C, V ). Thus
the complement of the unique winner problem for Young elections is Θp2-hard. Since Θ
p
2 is closed under
complement, this proves that the unique winner problem for Young elections is Θp2-hard. ❑
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(if all the constituents have a property then so does their hybrid) and of strong inheritance
(if even one of the constituents has a property then so does the hybrid).
Definition 2.5 We say that a property Γ is strongly inherited (respectively, inherited) by
hybrid if the following holds: Let k ∈ N+. Let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be candidate-anonymous elec-
tion systems (each taking as input (C, V ), with V a list of preference orders). It holds that
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) has property Γ if at least one of its constituents has (respectively,
all its constituents have) property Γ.
Definition 2.5 builds in the assumption that all constituents are candidate-anonymous.
This assumption isn’t overly onerous since as mentioned earlier candidate-anonymity is
very common—but will be used in many of our proofs. In effect, it is the price we pay for
our choice of “switching between systems” rule within hybrid. One might naturally worry
that as hybrid is not itself candidate-anonymous, inheritance results might be difficult to
prove for a hybrid of hybrids. That is true, but before reaching such an impasse one would
typically avoid it, namely, instead of trying to study
hybrid(hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1), hybrid(E
′
0, E
′
1, . . . , E
′
k′−1))
rather studying hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1, E
′
0, E
′
1, . . . , E
′
k′−1). Though there of course are issues
regarding default handling, in most settings this will not have problems, and in fact we will
do precisely this later (in the proof of Theorem 3.11).
Though we will build candidate-anonymity into the assumptions underlying inheritance,
we will often try to let interested readers know when that assumption is not needed. In
particular, when we say “inherited (and flexibly so)” or “strongly inherited (and flexibly
so),” the “(and flexibly so)” indicates that the claim holds even if in Definition 2.5 the words
“candidate-anonymous” are deleted. For example, the following easy but quite important
claim follows easily from the definition of hybrid.
Proposition 2.6 “Winner problem membership in P” and “unique winner problem mem-
bership in P” are inherited (and flexibly so) by hybrid.
That is, if E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 are election rules (all, as we assume globally, based on input
preference orders) for which testing whether a given candidate is the winner is in P (i.e.,
{(C, V, c) | c is a winner in the election specified by (C, V )} ∈ P), then the winner problem
for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is also in P. We similarly have that the following claim follows
easily from the definition of hybrid.
Proposition 2.7 “Winner problem membership in NP” and “unique winner problem mem-
bership in NP” are inherited (and flexibly so) by hybrid.
(In fact, it is easy to see that when the constituent systems are candidate-anonymous then,
for each k ≥ 0, it holds that the winner problem (respectively, unique winner problem)
of hybrid is in Σpk if and only if all the constituent winner problems (respectively, unique
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winner problems) are in Σpk, where Σ
p
k as is standard denotes the kth level of the polynomial
hierarchy.)
On the other hand, sometimes we will want to focus just on elections having a certain
property Φ, and for those we use the following definition.
Definition 2.8 We say that a property Γ is strongly inherited (respectively, inherited) by
hybrid on election systems having property Φ if the following holds: Let k ∈ N+. Let
E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be candidate-anonymous election systems (each taking as input (C, V ), with
V a list of preference orders) each having property Φ. It holds that hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)
has property Γ if at least one of its constituents has (respectively, all its constituents have)
property Γ.
2.6 Discussion of Some Concrete Objections
It is important when presenting an election system to make clear what the purpose of
defining it is and how it is intended to be used. This was already discussed in part in
Sections 1 and 2.2. However, we now have defined for the reader our hybridization scheme
and key notions such as control and inheritance, and so we are in a better position to be
able to address potential worries. So, as a way both of recapping some of the points of
Sections 1 and 2.2 and of making some additional important points about the nature of our
hybridization system, we will now state and discuss some interesting issues that one might
wonder about.
One natural issue is that our model is about worst-case hardness and so may not speak
to typical (frequent) hardness. One anonymous referee observed that since the vast majority
of the inputs will have mismatches in the moduli of the names (i.e., will have mismatches
in what the input names are congruent to modulo k) and so will map to the default system,
the election systems other than the default one “do not really matter.”
This actually raises a number of issues. We will try to now address them briefly but
clearly.
First, and most importantly, the core purpose of the hybrid scheme is not to be a system
that is used directly as a practical, real-world election system, but rather is, as discussed in
the introduction, to show that the impossibility result:
“For no election system whose winner complexity is in P are all twenty types of
control NP-hard.”
outright does not hold. And by showing that we can combine control resistances while
not boosting the complexity of the winner problem beyond P, our hybrid scheme in fact
breaks all hope of such an impossibility result, via showing that there is an election system
whose winner complexity is in P yet for which all twenty types of control are NP-hard
(Theorem 3.11).
Second, the hybrid scheme’s point is to in effect “join” its underlying systems. It provides
a one-stop system that allows one (by appropriately renaming the candidates) to get the
effect of any one of the underlying systems (assuming candidate-anonymity holds for those).
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As to the referee’s comment that the vast majority of the inputs will have mismatches in
the moduli of the names and so will map to the default system, and so the election systems
other than the default one “do not really matter,” the comment works best if one views the
entire hybrid as a stand-alone system intended for direct, natural use, and if one further
feels that such use should be with respect to a uniform distribution of inputs directly to
hybrid. But as argued in the previous paragraph, the hybrid scheme is not intended as
a system for direct, natural, real-world use; it is built to give insight into inheritance of
control resistance and most critically into (non)existence of impossibility results. Further,
even if one did want to look at the system relative to a uniform notion of inputs, given that
the system (as mentioned at the start of the present paragraph) is intended to combine k
systems, the natural notion of a uniform input draw would be to randomly choose one of the
k systems, randomly generate an instance there, and then mod-encode the names to place
that instance into the hybrid scheme. Note that in this approach/distribution, the frequency
of having inputs route to the default system due to name moduli mismatches would not be
very frequent but would be “absolutely never.” (As a very loose and admittedly imperfect
analogue, if one types random keystrokes, one is very unlikely to get a Boolean formula that
is syntactically well-formed. And so relative to an utterly uniform distribution of that sort,
SAT becomes trivial in the vast majority of cases. For us, agreement of name moduli is a
form of syntactic filter used to discipline the input, and inputs lacking agreement are swept
to the default system.)
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Third, let us make clear that there is a very real, important issue in the concrete objec-
tion being discussed. Namely, what about frequency of hardness, or even about average-case
hardness? Clearly, the hypothetical impossibility theorem above itself includes the notion of
NP-completeness, which is a worst-case theory, rather than one focused on either average-
case NP-hardness or frequency of hardness. It is indeed very natural to hope to achieve
average-case NP-hardness or frequency of hardness results. We fully agree that this is a
very interesting, important long-term issue. But we briefly mention some cautions and limi-
tations. Regarding average-case NP-hardness, a well-known theory developed by Levin [47],
the theory is lovely, but only a handful of problems have been shown to be average-case
NP-hard, and not a single one of those in any way involves elections. Regarding frequency
of hardness, there have been a number of recent results showing that certain NP-hard elec-
tion issues can be frequently simple, but to the best of our knowledge, none of those papers
obtains such results for any control problem.12 Briefly summarized, issues of average-case
NP-hardness and of frequency of correctness are clearly very interesting, are rightly gaining
attention, and we highly commend them to the reader while also mentioning that the field’s
understanding of such results and ability to obtain them is still very limited and currently
doesn’t exist at all for the case of control problems (except see the comment of the next
paragraph, which in a sense says that our work at least preserves good behavior in this
regard).
Still continuing on this third point, however, namely of frequency of hardness, in the par-
ticular case of the present paper’s work we do have a case where—in a certain rigorous sense
that is theoretically crisp although practically quite unsatisfying—inheritance of hardness
does hold. In particularly, it is clear, directly from our definitions, that hardness inherits
under our scheme—indeed, that hardness strongly inherits under our scheme. In particu-
lar, if even just one of the constituent systems (all required to be candidate anonymous) is
12All such work that we know of regards winner and manipulation problems, not control problems, and
even for the winner and control cases such results typically require one to choose the distribution very
carefully. For example, the work of [48,49] and [50] succeeds in the uniform distribution, but is not known to
hold under other distributions, and anyway is about winner problems and not about control or manipulation.
And in the interesting work of [51], which is about manipulation (not about control), the frequency of being
able to manipulate is conditioned inside the set of cases that are manipulable at all. For the one concrete
distribution family on which that paper does experiments, it is easy to see that except for the special
case of the uniform distribution, “p = 0.5” in their notation, asymptotically the portion of cases that are
manipulable is extraordinarily small (because whomever is at the top of what they call the “correct” ranking
will as the number of voters grows, win by a large amount when p 6= 0.5). So what one should take away is
not that the election systems are almost always easily manipulable, but rather that the election system they
studied are, for that distribution, almost never manipulable (but nonetheless that, and this is that paper’s
remarkable insight, conditioning within the extraordinarily low probability-weight of instances in which they
are manipulable, one can with high probability easily find a manipulation, again with this all framed within
that distribution). Without trying to here list all the other interesting papers addressing issues of frequency
of correctness, as there are many and all of them are not about the present paper’s focus (namely, control), we
mention as particularly interesting (and provocative) the work of Procaccia and Rosenschein on juntas and
manipulation [52], the Procaccia and Rosenschein fraction-of-manipulators work [53], the work of Friedgut,
Kalai, and Nisan on random manipulations [54], and the Zuckerman, Procaccia, and Rosenschein work on
coalition manipulation [55].
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exponentially often exponentially hard, then so is the hybridization of those systems. The
catch here is that it is a “small” exponential regarding the frequency of hardness, namely
2Ω(n), and so it ensures an exponentially rich core of hard instances, but it still could be
the case that the overwhelming majority of instances are easy.13
However, we should not allow ourselves to be overly sidetracked. The main points here
are simply that our hybrid system is primarily designed to show that control can be strongly
inherited, and it does so and thus completely rules out the natural, potential impossibility
result. And that issues of frequency of hardness are indeed interesting, although difficult
and typically very distribution-based, and deserve (and are getting) further investigation.
Regarding the first of these points, one might ask whether one really needs an artificial
system to preclude the impossibility result. The authors and P. Faliszewski have, motivated
by the present paper, looked hard at this issue. As mentioned earlier, they have very recently
shown (in [32] give or take one’s view on a technical fine point, and in [27] regardless of
one’s view on the technical fine point) that there is a natural system—one of the versions of
Copeland voting—that has a P winner problem yet is immune to all ten types of constructive
control. However, that system is vulnerable to most types of destructive control. And
so their work gives an alternate path to precluding a ten-constructive-case impossibility
result, but unlike the present paper does not preclude the main goal—a twenty-case overall
impossibility result—or even preclude a ten-destructive-case impossibility result.
This completes our discussion regarding whether systems other than the default really
matter in hybrid, and of issues of average-case NP-hardness and frequency of hardness. We
now turn to a second concrete worry one might have.
One anonymous referee proposed a different hybrid scheme than ours based on, on each
input, randomly choosing a system to route the question to. Unfortunately, that approach
to a hybrid scheme is not a valid election rule, as it uses probability not just to compute
13For completeness, let us be specific as to what is being claimed. Let us say a problem A is exponentially
often exponentially hard if there is an ǫ > 0 such that, for each Turing machine M accepting A, there are
an infinite number of lengths n at which M runs for at least 2ǫn steps on at least 2ǫn of the strings of that
length. Our theorem is this: Being exponentially often exponentially hard is strongly inherited (in the sense
of Definition 2.5) by hybrid. This is true simply because the process of taking an instance from one of
the constituent elections and recoding the names in the natural way to recast the instance into our hybrid
scheme increases the instance’s length at most linearly.
Our framing of this claim just said “there are an infinite number of lengths” at which the hardness holds,
but note that, again due to the fact that we can achieve at-most-linear instance-length-stretching, whatever
the original density of hard lengths is of the hard constituent system, the density of hard lengths in hybrid
will be no more than linearly less. Informally put, we don’t lose too much density of hard lengths.
We mention in passing that the above claim remains true if each 2Ω(n) above is changed to 2n
Ω(1)
, a dif-
ferent, even smaller notion of having exponentially many elements. Although 2Ω(n) and 2n
Ω(1)
are not prac-
tically very satisfyingly large when compared (regarding frequency) with 2n, we mention that in theoretical
computer science this type of density is very natural and typical in such settings. This is due to the fact
that for each ǫ > 0, every NP-hard set A is, by standard padding arguments, known to be polynomial-time
many-one equivalent to sets (e.g., {0|x|
k
#x | x ∈ A}, where k is chosen to satisfy k > 1/ǫ) that for each n
are trivial on all but 2n
ǫ
of their length n strings. Indeed, for almost precisely this reason, Levin’s theory
of average-case NP-hardness [47] allows some sets that are trivial on all but at most 2n
ǫ
of their length n
strings to be average-case NP-hard.
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something, but also its output itself is probabilistic. That is, if one were to repeatedly run
the exact same set of completed ballots through that “rule,” one would get different winners
on different such runs. That isn’t an election rule in the standard sense universally used to
study control, and the reduction framework (that we ourselves exploit to prove hardness)
does not apply to this. In addition, the present paper proves results for its system.
We now turn to a third concrete worry. Our paper’s key tool is a hybrid scheme. We
then apply it using certain building blocks (constituent election systems to be hybridized
together). Let us say a voting system is voiced (see [21]) if (whenever there is at least one
candidate) there will be at least one winner. Although nonvoiced systems have been allowed
in the study of control in every paper we know of on control, one might dislike the fact that
in some places in this paper we use building blocks that are not voiced (may sometimes have
no winner). The two building blocks we use that are not voiced are Condorcet elections
and an artificial election system we call Enot-all-one. However, we point out that one can just
as easily toss out those two building blocks and use instead any other existing system(s)
that have the resistance properties that the discarded blocks were being used for and that
in addition are voiced. Such systems have been proven (although just recently) to exist.
Combined with the easy-to-see claim that voiced-ness inherits under our hybrid scheme,
one can, if one dislikes nonvoiced systems, establish the theorems in question via a voiced
hybrid of voiced systems.14
3 Inheritance and Hybrid Elections: Susceptibility, Resis-
tance, Immunity, and Vulnerability
In this section we will discuss the inheritance properties of hybrid with respect to suscepti-
bility, resistance, immunity, and vulnerability. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our results for the
cases of, respectively, constructive control and destructive control. (These tables do not dis-
cuss/include the issue of when “(and flexibly so)” holds, i.e., when the candidate-anonymity
assumption is not needed, but rather focus on our basic inheritance definition.)
3.1 Susceptibility
We first note that susceptibility strongly inherits. In fact, we prove something slightly
stronger, as for only the susceptible constituent do we need to assume candidate-anonymity
(also, as noted in the introduction, candidate-affine-invariance would actually suffice). We
remind the reader that throughout this paper, when we speak of an election system, we
always implicitly mean an election system that takes as input (C, V ) (see Footnote 3) with
V a list of preference orders over C.
14To be utterly concrete about this, Condorcet voting is used in this paper for its resistance to constructive
control by adding, deleting and partitioning of voters, and Enot-all-one is used in this paper for its resistance
to destructive control by adding, deleting and partitioning of voters (in the TE model). However, very recent
work [32] has proven that the natural, voiced election system of Llull (and also the natural, voiced election
system of Copeland and many variants [32,27]) itself has all of these resistance properties, and so one can,
if one requires voiced systems, employ Llull elections here in place of both Condorcet and Enot-all-one.
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Control by Susceptibility Resistance Immunity Vulnerability
Adding Candidates SI SI Not I I
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.19
Deleting Candidates SI SI I I if and only if P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.14 3.24
Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TE) unique winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.34
Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TP) winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.34
Run-off Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TE) unique winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.30
Run-off Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TP) winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.30
Adding Voters SI SI I I
3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Deleting Voters SI SI I I
3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Partition SI SI I I
of Voters (TE) 3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Partition SI SI I I
of Voters (TP) 3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Table 1: Inheritance results that hold or provably fail for hybrid with respect to constructive
control. Key: I = Inherits. SI = Strongly Inherits. The numbers in each box give results
establishing or implying that box’s claim. Those table entries in the vulnerability column
containing “on election systems” clauses are somewhat informally stated above; see the
cited results for precise statements.
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Control by Susceptibility Resistance Immunity Vulnerability
Adding Candidates SI SI I I
3.2 3.4 3.16 3.19
Deleting Candidates SI SI Not I I if and only if P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.37
Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TE) unique winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.39
Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TP) winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.39
Run-off Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TE) unique winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.39
Run-off Partition SI SI Not I On election systems having
of Candidates (TP) winner problems in PH:
I iff SI iff P = NP
3.2 3.4 3.18 3.39
Adding Voters SI SI I I
3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Deleting Voters SI SI I I
3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Partition SI SI I I
of Voters (TE) 3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Partition SI SI I I
of Voters (TP) 3.2 3.4 3.17 3.20
Table 2: Inheritance results that hold or provably fail for hybrid with respect to destructive
control. Key: I = Inherits. SI = Strongly Inherits. The numbers in each box give results
establishing or implying that box’s claim. Those table entries in the vulnerability column
containing “on election systems” clauses are somewhat informally stated above; see the
cited results for precise statements.
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Theorem 3.1 Let k ∈ N+ and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems. Let Φ be one of
the standard twenty types of (constructive and destructive) control. If for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k−1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to Φ, then hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)
is susceptible to Φ.
Proof. Take an example showing that Ei is susceptible to Φ and rename each candidate
c in it to now be named kc + i. This transformed example will, due to Ei’s candidate-
anonymity, be an example showing hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s susceptibility to Φ. ❑
We note in passing that there is nothing particularly limiting the above theorem to the
standard twenty types of control. The embedding would work equally well on almost any
natural control type one might imagine.
Theorem 3.1 immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 hybrid strongly inherits susceptibility to each of the standard twenty types
of control.
3.2 Resistance
We now come to the most important inheritance case, namely, that of resistance. Since our
hope is that hybrid elections will broaden resistance, the ideal case would be to show that
resistance is strongly inherited. And we will indeed show that, and from it will conclude
that there exist election systems that are resistant to all twenty standard types of control.
We first prove the key result, which uses the fact that hybrid can embed its constituents
to allow us to ≤pm-reduce from control problems about its constituents to control problems
about hybrid.
Theorem 3.3 Let k ∈ N+ and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems. Let Φ be one of
the standard twenty types of (constructive and destructive) control. If for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and resistant to Φ, then hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)
is resistant to Φ.15
Proof. Let Φ and i and E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 satisfy the conditions of the theorem. By
Theorem 3.1, hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is susceptible to Φ, since Ei’s resistance ensures that
Ei is susceptible. And since Ei is resistant to Φ, the control problem for Ei is NP-hard.
Now, note that the control problem for Ei with respect to Φ itself many-one polynomial-
time reduces to the control problem for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) with respect to Φ, via the
15 A referee presented a “counterexample” that, though incorrect, is worth refuting so that no other reader
need have the same worry. Briefly put, the referee noticed that if E0 and E1 are candidate-anonymous election
systems such that E0 is resistant to control type Φ and E1 is not, then hybrid(E0, E1) will be routed to E1
unless all candidate names are even, and then said that since it will not always be the case that all candidate
names are even, this showed that the hybrid was not resistant. The error in this reasoning is the incorrect
implicit claim that NP-hard problems cannot have subcases—sometimes even quite broad ones—in P. They
in fact can, e.g., 2CNF-SAT is in P.
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reduction that replaces each candidate name c with the name kc+ i. So the control problem
for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) with respect to Φ is itself NP-hard. ❑
We note in passing that there is nothing particularly limiting the above theorem to the
standard twenty types of control. The proof’s many-one reduction would work equally well
on almost any natural control type one might imagine.
Theorem 3.3 immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 hybrid strongly inherits resistance to each of the standard twenty types of
control.
Before we turn to applying this corollary, let us note that Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4
are both, as is this entire paper, within the most natural, most typical model: Votes are
input as a list (“nonsuccinct” input) and each vote counts equally (“unweighted” votes).
We mention that for each of the other three cases—“succinct, weighted,” “succinct, un-
weighted,” and “nonsuccinct, weighted”—Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 both still hold
(by the same proofs as above).
Let us apply Corollary 3.4 to obtain election systems that are broadly resistant to
control. (We mention that since this paper first appeared, [27] (see also [32]) has created a
very attractive alternate way of seeing that systems exist that resist the ten standard types
of constructive control, namely, by proving that Copeland’s election system resists the ten
standard constructive control types. Unfortunately, the just-cited papers also show that
Copeland elections do not resist some of the ten standard destructive control types.)
Corollary 3.5 There exist election systems—for example, hybrid(plurality,Condorcet)—
that are resistant to all the standard ten types of constructive control.
Proof. By the work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick ([2], see also [21] regarding the tie-
handling rules), for each of the standard ten types of constructive control, at least one of
plurality and Condorcet is resistant. So by Corollary 3.4 and the candidate-anonymity of
plurality and Condorcet, we are done. ❑
To make the same claim for destructive control, we first construct an (artificial) system,
Enot-all-one (we define this system shortly), having the missing three resistance properties.
(As mentioned earlier, an alternate approach would be to rely on work done after this paper,
stating that the system “Copeland0.5” has these three resistances [27], and then to use that
system as a component and hybridize using it.)
Lemma 3.6 There exists a candidate-anonymous election system, Enot-all-one, that is resis-
tant to
1. destructive control by deleting voters,
2. destructive control by adding voters, and
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3. destructive control by partition of voters in the TE model.
Proof. Our proof constructs reductions from Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C, for short),
which is one of the standard NP-complete problems (see Garey and Johnson [56]) and is
defined as follows:
Exact Cover by Three-Sets (X3C)
Given: A set B, and a family S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} of subsets Si of B with ‖Si‖ = 3 for
each i.
Question: Does S have an exact cover for B? That is, is there a subfamily S ′ ⊆ S such
that every element of B occurs in exactly one set in S ′?
The system Enot-all-one works as follows: The first four candidates in each vote get one
point each. A candidate c is a winner if and only if c is the most preferred candidate of a
strict majority of the voters and it is not the case that all candidates other than c have one
point. Note that if c is a winner, then c is the unique winner. It is immediate that Enot-all-one
is candidate-anonymous and it is easy to see that Enot-all-one is susceptible to destructive
control by deleting voters, adding voters, and partition of voters in the TE model.
NP-hardness of the destructive control problem follows in all three cases from a re-
duction from the problem X3C. Let (B,S) be an instance of X3C with ‖B‖ = m,
S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}, Si ⊆ B, and ‖Si‖ = 3 for each i. Without loss of generality, we
assume that m is divisible by 3 and m/3 ≥ 1. Construct an instance of Destructive Control
by Deleting Voters as follows. The candidate set is defined as C = B ∪ {d}, where d is the
distinguished candidate. The set V of voters consists of n preference orders corresponding
to the sets in S: For each i, V contains voter d > Si > · · · , where “Si” denotes the elements
of Si in some arbitrary order, and “· · · ” means that the remaining candidates follow in some
arbitrary order.
Claim 3.7 (B,S) is in X3C if and only if there is a set V ′ ⊆ V such that ‖V ′‖ ≤ n−m/3
and d is not the unique winner of (C, V − V ′).
Proof of Claim 3.7. Suppose that (B,S) is in X3C. Let V ′′ consist of m/3 voters from
V that correspond to an exact cover and let V ′ = V − V ′′. Then ‖V ′‖ = n−m/3 and each
candidate c ∈ C, c 6= d, scores one point in V ′′ = V − V ′. So, d is not the unique winner of
(C, V − V ′).
For the converse, let V ′ ⊆ V be such that ‖V ′‖ ≤ n−m/3 and d is not the unique winner
of (C, V − V ′). Since d is the most preferred candidate for every voter in V and V − V ′ is
not empty (since m/3 ≥ 1), it follows that all other candidates score one point in V − V ′.
This implies that the voters in V −V ′ correspond to an exact cover of S. ❑ Claim 3.7
Claim 3.7 establishes Case 1 of Lemma 3.6.
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We will use a similar construction to reduce X3C to Destructive Control by Adding
Voters. The candidate set is now defined as C = B ∪ {d, c1, c2, c3}. The set V of registered
voters consists of one voter d > c1 > c2 > c3 > · · · and the set W of unregistered voters
consists of n preference orders corresponding to the sets in S: For each i, W contains voter
d > Si > · · · , where “Si” denotes the elements of Si in some arbitrary order, and “· · · ”
means that the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order.
Claim 3.8 (B,S) is in X3C if and only if there is a set W ′ ⊆ W such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ m/3
and d is not the unique winner of (C, V ∪W ′).
Proof of Claim 3.8. Suppose that (B,S) is in X3C. Let W ′ consist of m/3 voters from
W that correspond to an exact cover. Then each candidate c ∈ C, c 6= d, scores one point
in V ∪W ′. So, d is not the unique winner of (C, V ∪W ′).
For the converse, let W ′ ⊆ W be such that ‖W ′‖ ≤ m/3 and d is not the unique winner
of (C, V ∪W ′). Since d is the most preferred candidate for every voter in V ∪W ′ and V ∪W ′
is not empty, it follows that all other candidates score one point in V ∪W ′. This implies
that the voters in W ′ correspond to an exact cover of S. ❑ Claim 3.8
Claim 3.8 establishes Case 2 of Lemma 3.6.
We will use a similar construction to reduce X3C to Destructive Control by Partition of
Voters in the TE model. As in the previous case, the candidate set is defined as C = B ∪
{d, c1, c2, c3}. The set V of voters consists of one voter of the form d > c1 > c2 > c3 > · · · , n
voters of the form c1 > · · · , and n preference orders corresponding to the sets in S: For each
i, V contains voter d > Si > · · · , where “Si” denotes the elements of Si in some arbitrary
order, and “· · · ” means that the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order.
Claim 3.9 (B,S) is in X3C if and only if d can be made to be not the unique winner of
this election by partition of voters in the TE model.16
Proof of Claim 3.9. Suppose that (B,S) is in X3C. Let the first subelection consist of
voter d > c1 > c2 > c3 > · · · and m/3 voters of the form d > Si > · · · that correspond to
an exact cover. Then d does not win the first subelection. d also does not win the second
subelection, since most voters in the second subelection prefer c1. Since d wins neither
subelection, d is not an overall winner of the election.
For the converse, suppose that d is not the unique winner of the election. Since d is
the unique winner of every subelection that involves d and at most one other candidate,
it follows that d is the unique winner of the final run-off if d participates in the final run-
off. Since d is not the unique winner of the election, d cannot participate in the final
run-off, and should thus lose both subelections. In at least one of the subelections, d is
the most preferred candidate for a strict majority of the voters. Since d does not win this
16In fact, the tie-handling rule is irrelevant here, since there is always at most one winner in an Enot-all-one
election. However, we state the claim for the TE model because that is what we need for Lemma 3.6.
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subelection, the voters in this subelection of the form d > Si > · · · correspond to an exact
cover. ❑ Claim 3.9
Claim 3.9 establishes Case 3 of Lemma 3.6. ❑ Lemma 3.6
Corollary 3.10 There exist election systems that are resistant to all ten standard types of
destructive control.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6 and the work of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [21],
for each of the standard ten types of destructive control, at least one of plurality and
Enot-all-one is resistant. So by Corollary 3.4 and the candidate-anonymity of plurality and
Enot-all-one, we are done. ❑
We cannot apply Theorem 3.3 directly to rehybridize the systems of Corollaries 3.5
and 3.10, because hybrid itself is not in general candidate-anonymous. However, we can get
the same conclusion by directly hybridizing all the constituents underlying Corollaries 3.5
and 3.10.
Theorem 3.11 There exist election systems that are resistant to all twenty standard types
of control.
The proof simply is to consider hybrid(plurality,Condorcet, Enot-all-one).
3.3 Immunity
We now turn to inheritance of immunity. Here, for each of constructive and destructive
control, five cases inherit and five cases provably fail to inherit.
However, let is first pause a moment to define the artificial, candidate-anonymous elec-
tion system Enull, in which all candidates always lose. Note that Enull is immune to all
twenty standard types of control—trivially, since no one ever wins. This type of result
shows why it is natural to focus, as this paper does, on achieving broad resistance rather
than on achieving broad immunity: Resistance is less trivializable than immunity. In fact,
we will now turn to showing that immunity to constructive control by deleting candidates is
inherited by hybrid (Theorem 3.14), and our proof of that will be based on a trivialization
of immunity. In that proof, we will employ the following somewhat interesting triviality
result.
Theorem 3.12 Any candidate-anonymous election system that is immune to constructive
control by deleting candidates can never have a unique winner.
Proof. Let E be any candidate-anonymous election system that is immune to constructive
control by deleting candidates. Suppose there is an election (C, V ) in which some candidate,
say c ∈ C, is the unique winner, and let V consist of the voters v1, v2, . . . , vk. By candidate-
anonymity of E , there is a candidate set D with D ∩ C = ∅ that simply renames all
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candidates in C, and a voter set W consisting of voters w1, w2, . . . , wk that simply renames
all candidates occurring in V from their C names to their D names such that d ∈ D is the
unique winner of (D,W ). Now, consider the election with candidate set C ∪D and voter
set X consisting of the k preference orders
vi,1 > vi,2 > · · · > vi,‖C‖ > wi,1 > wi,2 > · · · > wi,‖D‖,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k and the ith voter in, respectively, V and W has preference order vi =
vi,1 > vi,2 > · · · > vi,‖C‖ and wi = wi,1 > wi,2 > · · · > wi,‖D‖.
If c is not a unique winner of the election (C ∪D,X), then E is not immune to con-
structive control by deleting candidates, as by deleting D, c becomes the unique winner.
Similarly, if d is not a unique winner of the election (C ∪D,X), then E is not immune to
constructive control by deleting candidates, as by deleting C, d becomes the unique win-
ner. However, since E is immune to constructive control by deleting candidates and since
(C ∪D,X) cannot have both c and d be unique winners, our supposition that E can have
a unique winner is contradicted. ❑
The following lemma follows immediately from the definition of hybrid.
Lemma 3.13 “Never having a unique winner” is inherited by hybrid.
We now can prove our claim.
Theorem 3.14 Immunity to constructive control by deleting candidates is inherited by
hybrid.
Proof. If E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 are candidate-anonymous election systems that are immune to
constructive control by deleting candidates, then by Theorem 3.12 each never has a unique
winner. So by Lemma 3.13, hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) never has a unique winner. This proves
that hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is immune to every type of control. ❑
By applying a duality result of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe k times, we
can retarget this to a type of destructive control.
Proposition 3.15 ([21])
1. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding candidates if and only
if it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates.
2. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates if and
only if it is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.
Corollary 3.16 Immunity to destructive control by adding candidates is inherited by
hybrid.
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Proof. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 3.14 plus 1 + (k − 1) applications
of Proposition 3.15.2. ❑
hybrid’s immunity to all voter-related types of control is immediate.
Theorem 3.17 Immunity to constructive and destructive control under each of these:
1. adding voters,
2. deleting voters,
3. partition of voters in model TE, and
4. partition of voters in model TP
is inherited (and flexibly so) by hybrid.
Proof. Since none of this theorem’s four operations changes the candidate set, hybrid
routes all election evaluations related to a given input to the same election system Ei, and
so by that system’s immunity the theorem holds. ❑
For the ten remaining cases, inheritance does not hold.
Theorem 3.18 hybrid does not inherit immunity to:
1. constructive control by adding candidates,
2. destructive control by deleting candidates,
3. constructive control by partition and run-off partition of candidates (both in model TE
and TP), and
4. destructive control by partition and run-off partition of candidates (both in model TE
and TP).
Proof. For each of these ten control problems, we provide a counterexample showing
that immunity is not inherited by hybrid. We will use the artificial, candidate-anonymous
election systems Efirst and Elast, which are defined as follows. A candidate c wins an Efirst
election if and only if there is one voter and this voter ranks c first. A candidate c wins an
Elast election if and only if there is one voter and this voter ranks c last. It is immediate
that Efirst and Elast are candidate-anonymous.
1. It is immediate that Efirst and Elast are both immune to constructive control by adding
candidates. However, hybrid(Efirst, Elast) is susceptible to constructive control by
adding candidates. To see that, consider the election with set C = {0, 2} of qualified
candidates, set D = {1} of possible spoiler candidates, and voter set V consisting of
one voter with preference order 2 > 1 > 0. Candidate 0 loses in hybrid(Efirst, Elast) in
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election (C, V ): All candidate names in C are congruent to 0 mod 2, so hybrid routes
its input to Efirst. However, if the spoiler candidate 1 is added to C and so the election
(C ∪D,V ) is input to hybrid(Efirst, Elast), this switches hybrid to now implement Elast,
and so candidate 0 now is the unique winner of this election. Thus, hybrid(Efirst, Elast)
is not immune to constructive control by adding candidates.
2. This claim follows immediately from Part 1 and Proposition 3.15.1.
3. It is easy to see that Efirst and Elast are immune to constructive control by partition
and run-off partition of candidates in models TE and TP: No matter how we partition
the candidates, there can only be winners if there is exactly one voter. And in an
election with one voter, the first-ranked (respectively, last-ranked) candidate is the
unique winner of the election for all partitions of candidates in all partitioning models.
However, hybrid(Efirst, Elast) is susceptible to constructive control by partition and run-
off partition of candidates in models TE and TP. To see that, consider the election
with candidate set C = {0, 1, 2}, distinguished candidate 2, and voter set V consisting
of one voter with preference order 2 > 1 > 0. On input (C, V ), hybrid(Efirst, Elast)
routes the election to Elast, so 0 is the unique winner of the election. Now consider the
candidate partition C1 = {0, 1} and C2 = {2}. Then 0 is the unique winner of (C1, V )
and 2 is the unique winner of (C2, V ). So, in both partition and run-off partition of
candidates in models TE and TP, the final round of the election is ({0, 2}, V ). Since
all candidate names are congruent to 0 mod 2, hybrid routes its input to Efirst, so 2 is
the unique winner. Since 2 has been turned from a nonwinner into a unique winner, it
follows that hybrid(Efirst, Elast) is susceptible to constructive control by partition and
run-off partition of candidates in models TE and TP.
4. The argument given at the start of Part 3 of this proof also shows that Efirst and Elast
are immune to destructive control by partition and run-off partition of candidates
in models TE and TP. To show that hybrid(Efirst, Elast) is susceptible to destructive
control by partition and run-off partition of candidates in models TE and TP, it
suffices to note that the candidate partition of Part 3 of this proof turns candidate 0
from a unique winner into a nonwinner.
❑
3.4 Vulnerability
hybrid strongly inherited resistance, which is precisely what one wants, since that is both
the aesthetically pleasing case and broadens resistance to control. However, for vulnerability
it is less clear what outcome to root for. Inheritance would be the mathematically more
beautiful outcome. But on the other hand, what inheritance would inherit is vulnerability,
and vulnerability to control is in general a bad thing—so maybe one should hope for “Not
I(nherits)” entries for our tables in this column. In fact, our results here are mixed. In
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particular, we for ten cases prove that inheritance holds unconditionally and for ten cases
prove that inheritance holds (though in some cases we have to limit ourselves to election
systems with winner/unique winner problems that fall into the polynomial hierarchy) if and
only if P = NP. Since any practically useful election system should have winner/unique
winner problems in P, this is not an onerous limitation. Indeed, even such “difficult” election
systems as those of Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young have winner/unique winner problems in
the polynomial hierarchy.
We start with two vulnerability results that can be established by direct algorithmic
attacks.
Theorem 3.19 hybrid inherits vulnerability to both constructive and destructive control by
adding candidates.
Proof. We start with the constructive case. Let k ∈ N+ and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be
candidate-anonymous election systems each vulnerable to constructive control by adding
candidates. Let Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, be the polynomial-time algorithms showing that Ei is
vulnerable to constructive control by adding candidates.
Since E0 is vulnerable to constructive control by adding candidates, E0 is suscepti-
ble to constructive control by adding candidates, and it follows from Theorem 3.1 that
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is susceptible to constructive control by adding candidates.
To complete our proof of vulnerability, we turn to seeking a polynomial-time algorithm
for this control problem. Given an instance of Constructive Control by Adding Candidates,
let Q be the set of qualified candidates with c ∈ Q being the distinguished candidate, let S
be the set of spoiler candidates, and let V be the voter set with preferences over Q∪S. We
distinguish the following three cases.
Case 1: Not all candidates in Q have the same value modulo k. Then, regardless of
whether none, some, or all candidates from S are added, the initial and final elec-
tion will be routed by hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) to Edefault = Ek−1. Thus, we can simply
invoke algorithm Ak−1.
Case 2: All candidates in Q have the same value modulo k, call it q, and all candidates
in S also have values congruent to q mod k. Then we simply invoke algorithm Aq.
Case 3: All candidates in Q have the same value modulo k, call it q, and at least one
candidate in S has a value not congruent to q mod k. Then we do the following:
Step 1: Invoke Aq to see if victory (i.e., being the unique winner) for c is possible in
Eq with Q as the set of qualified candidates, Sq as the set of spoiler candidates,
where Sq contains all members of S whose values are congruent to q mod k, and
with voter set V (restricted to the participating candidates). If algorithm Aq
says YES, then output YES and halt; otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2: For each d ∈ S ∩ {i | i 6≡ q mod k}, invoke Ak−1 to see if victory for
c is possible in Edefault = Ek−1 with Q ∪ {d} as the set of qualified candidates,
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S′ = S−{d} as the set of of spoiler candidates, and with voter set V . If algorithm
Ak−1 says YES, then output YES and halt; otherwise go to the next iteration of
this for-each loop.
Step 3: If we reach this step (i.e., the for-each loop in Step 2 was not successful in
any of its iterations), then output “victory for c is impossible” and halt.
Note that the reason we in Case 3 had to include the “try each non-mod-q as being
forced in” flourish is that only when at least one non-mod-q candidate is in the candidate
set will we switch from Eq to Edefault, so we must be very careful to only use Edefault regarding
cases that will be routed to it. We cannot in any obvious way replace the loop with a single
test, as a single vulnerability test does not let us address “Is there some subset of the spoiler
set that includes at least one marked spoiler and that makes c win?” as that is a different
problem, though the algorithm in effect does that via a polynomial number of ordinary
vulnerability tests.
As to the destructive case, it follows from Theorem 3.1 that hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)
is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates. To show that vulnerability
inherits, exactly the same algorithm as above works, except with each time “victory” occurs
replaced with “not being a unique winner,” and of course when we now call the underlying
polynomial-time algorithms for Ei, they will be for the case of destructive control by adding
candidates. ❑
We now state eight trivial inheritance cases.
Theorem 3.20 Vulnerability to constructive and destructive control by adding voters,
deleting voters, partition of voters in model TE, and partition of voters in model TP are all
inherited by hybrid.
Proof. None of these operations changes the candidate set, so whatever system hybrid
routes the input to (E0 or E1 or . . . or Ek−1 or Edefault = Ek−1) will handle all the election
evaluations related to the given input, and so we can directly use its polynomial-time
algorithm showing vulnerability to the given type of control. Susceptibility follows from
Theorem 3.1. ❑
We are down to ten cases—deleting candidates and the four candidate-based partition
cases, with each of those five cases appearing in constructive control and destructive control
versions. For these ten cases, we will prove that inheritance holds (though in some cases
we have to limit ourselves to election systems whose winner/unique winner problems are in
the polynomial hierarchy) if and only if P = NP.
Theorem 3.21 Let Φ be one of the following two control types:
1. constructive control by deleting candidates,
2. destructive control by deleting candidates,
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let k ∈ N+, and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems whose Φ-control problems are in
the polynomial hierarchy and such that for at least one i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-
anonymous and susceptible to Φ. If P = NP then hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is vulnerable
to Φ.
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 that hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is suscepti-
ble to Φ. To show vulnerability, note that for constructive control by deleting candidates the
unique winner problem ≤pm-reduces (via the trick mentioned in Section 2.4: asking about
deleting zero candidates) to the control problem. And for destructive control by deleting
candidates, by the same trick, we have that the unique winner problem ≤pm-reduces to the
complement of the control problem. So in both cases, since P = NP is assumed and the con-
trol problems are assumed to be in the polynomial hierarchy, we do have a polynomial-time
algorithm for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s unique winner problem by Proposition 2.6. Now,
guess every possible way of legally deleting candidates and using the polynomial-time algo-
rithm for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) see if under some such way our goal (making a specified
candidate the unique winner or precluding a specified candidate from being a unique win-
ner) can be achieved. This is an NP algorithm but since P = NP it proves vulnerability
to Φ. ❑
Corollary 3.22 If P = NP then hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive and destruc-
tive control by deleting candidates.
On the other hand, we have the following result. Since the reader has earlier in this
paper seen many examples of our resistance proofs and has just seen some vulnerability-
related constructions, for the rest of this section we defer the proofs to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.23 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 that are vul-
nerable to constructive control by deleting candidates but such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant
to constructive control by deleting candidates.
From Corollary 3.22, Theorem 3.23, and the fact that if P 6= NP then resistance implies
nonvulnerability, we have our characterization.
Corollary 3.24 P = NP if and only if hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive control
by deleting candidates.
The corresponding characterization for the case of destructive control by deleting can-
didates will be established later as Corollary 3.37. We note that the proof of Theorem 3.23
also immediately establishes the following, by taking E0 = Enull, the election system in which
all candidates always lose.
Corollary 3.25 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 such that E0
is immune to constructive control by deleting candidates and E1 is vulnerable to constructive
control by deleting candidates but such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control
by deleting candidates.
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Unfortunately, the analogs of Theorem 3.21 for candidate-related partitions are less
clean. Regarding the strengths in the hypotheses in the following theorem, we mention
that when a winner problem is in the polynomial hierarchy, that clearly implies that the
corresponding unique winner problem is in the polynomial hierarchy.
Theorem 3.26 1. Let Φ be one of the following four control types:
(a) constructive control by partition of candidates in model TP,
(b) destructive control by partition of candidates in model TP,
(c) constructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TP,
(d) destructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TP,
let k ∈ N+, and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems such that for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to Φ. If P = NP and
the winner problem for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is in the polynomial hierarchy, then
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is vulnerable to Φ.
2. Let Φ be one of the following four control types:
(a) constructive control by partition of candidates in model TE,
(b) destructive control by partition of candidates in model TE,
(c) constructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TE,
(d) destructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TE,
let k ∈ N+, and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems such that for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to Φ. If P = NP and
the unique winner problem for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is in the polynomial hierarchy,
then hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is vulnerable to Φ.
In light of Proposition 2.6, Theorem 3.26 certainly implies the following weaker but
more naturally formed result.
Corollary 3.27 1. Let Φ be one of the following four control types:
(a) constructive control by partition of candidates in model TP,
(b) destructive control by partition of candidates in model TP,
(c) constructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TP,
(d) destructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TP,
let k ∈ N+, and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems such that for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to Φ. If P = NP and
the winner problems for each of E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 are in the polynomial hierarchy, then
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is vulnerable to Φ.
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2. Let Φ be one of the following four control types:
(a) constructive control by partition of candidates in model TE,
(b) destructive control by partition of candidates in model TE,
(c) constructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TE,
(d) destructive control by run-off partition of candidates in model TE,
let k ∈ N+, and let E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 be election systems such that for at least one i,
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Ei is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to Φ. If P = NP and the
unique winner problems for each of E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1 are in the polynomial hierarchy,
then hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is vulnerable to Φ.
On the other hand, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.28 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 that are vul-
nerable to constructive control by run-off partition of candidates (in models TE and TP) but
such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by run-off partition of candidates
(in models TE and TP).
Corollary 3.29 If P 6= NP then hybrid does not inherit vulnerability to constructive control
by run-off partition of candidates in model TE or TP.
Corollaries 3.27 and 3.29 certainly imply the following result.
Corollary 3.30 1. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive control by run-off partition of can-
didates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to constructive control by run-off partition
of candidates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in
the polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
2. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive control by run-off partition of candi-
dates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to constructive control by run-off partition
of candidates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
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We note that the proof (in Appendix A) of Theorem 3.28 also immediately establishes
the following, by taking E0 = Enull, the election system in which all candidates always lose.
Corollary 3.31 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 such that E0
is immune to constructive control by run-off partition of candidates (in models TE and TP)
and E1 is vulnerable to constructive control by run-off partition of candidates (in models TE
and TP) but such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by run-off partition
of candidates (in models TE and TP).
We now turn to the analogs of Theorem 3.28 and Corollaries 3.29, 3.30, and 3.31 for
constructive control by partition of candidates.
Theorem 3.32 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 that are vul-
nerable to constructive control by partition of candidates (in models TE and TP) but such
that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by partition of candidates (in models
TE and TP).
Corollary 3.33 If P 6= NP then hybrid does not inherit vulnerability to constructive control
by partition of candidates in model TE or TP.
Corollaries 3.27 and 3.33 certainly imply the following result.
Corollary 3.34 1. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to constructive control by partition of can-
didates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
2. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial hierar-
chy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to constructive control by partition of candi-
dates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
We note that the proof (in Appendix A) of Theorem 3.32 also immediately establishes
the following, by taking E0 = Enull, the election system in which all candidates always lose.
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Corollary 3.35 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 such that E0
is immune to constructive control by partition of candidates (in models TE and TP) and
E1 is vulnerable to constructive control by partition of candidates (in models TE and TP)
but such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by partition of candidates
(in models TE and TP).
We now turn to the destructive control cases.
Theorem 3.36 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 that are vul-
nerable to destructive control by deleting candidates, partition of candidates (in models
TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates (in models TE and TP), but such that
hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to destructive control by deleting candidates, partition of candi-
dates (in models TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates (in models TE and TP).
From Corollary 3.22, Theorem 3.36 and the fact that if P 6= NP then resistance implies
nonvulnerability, we obtain a complete characterization of the destructive control by deleting
candidates case.
Corollary 3.37 P = NP if and only if hybrid inherits vulnerability to destructive control
by deleting candidates.
Recall that we don’t quite have the analog of Corollary 3.22 for the partition cases.
Theorem 3.36 established the following implication.
Corollary 3.38 If P 6= NP then hybrid does not inherit vulnerability to destructive control
by partition of candidates (in models TE and TP) and run-off partition of candidates (in
models TE and TP).
Corollaries 3.27 and 3.38 certainly imply the following result.
Corollary 3.39 1. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to destructive control by partition of can-
didates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
2. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial hierar-
chy.
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(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to destructive control by partition of candi-
dates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
3. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to destructive control by run-off partition of can-
didates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to destructive control by run-off partition
of candidates in model TE on election systems having unique winner problems in
the polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
4. The following are equivalent.
(a) hybrid inherits vulnerability to destructive control by run-off partition of candi-
dates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the polynomial
hierarchy.
(b) hybrid strongly inherits vulnerability to destructive control by run-off partition
of candidates in model TP on election systems having winner problems in the
polynomial hierarchy.
(c) P = NP.
We note that the proof (in Appendix A) of Theorem 3.36 also immediately establishes
the following, by taking E0 to be the election system where c wins if and only if c is first in
the first voter.
Corollary 3.40 There exist candidate-anonymous election systems E0 and E1 such that E0
is immune to destructive control by deleting candidates, partition of candidates (in models
TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates (in models TE and TP), (in models TE
and TP) and E1 is vulnerable to to destructive control by deleting candidates, partition
of candidates (in models TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates (in models TE
and TP), but such that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to destructive control by deleting candi-
dates, partition of candidates (in models TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates
(in models TE and TP).
4 Conclusions
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our inheritance results. The main contribution of this paper is
the hybrid system, the fact that hybrid strongly inherits resistance, and the consequence
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that there is an election system that resists all twenty standard types of electoral control.
A very natural direction for future research is to broadly explore the control behavior of
standard election systems, and in particular to see if any exhibit broad resistance to control.
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A Deferred Proofs from Section 3.4
We now give the proofs deferred from Section 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.23. In E0, each candidate wins if and only if it is the only candi-
date. Clearly, E0 is candidate-anonymous and susceptible to constructive control by deleting
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candidates, and it is a polynomial-time task to decide when control can be asserted, so E0
is vulnerable to this type of control.
Election system E1 is defined as follows. For each candidate c ∈ C, c wins election
(C, V ) if and only if ‖V ‖ ≥ 2, c is ranked first by the first voter in V (recall that V is input
as a list, and so it is meaningful to speak of the first voter), and (c is ranked first by the
second voter in V or c is ranked first or second by all voters). It is immediate that E1 is
candidate-anonymous and susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates. The
following polynomial-time algorithm shows that E1 is vulnerable to constructive control by
deleting candidates:
Step 1: Given an instance (C, c, V, k) of Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates, if
‖V ‖ < 2, then reject and halt. Otherwise, let C1 be the set of all candidates preferred
to c by the first voter of V and let C2 be the set of all candidates preferred to c by
the second voter of V .
Step 2: If ‖C1 ∪ C2‖ ≤ k then accept and halt (c can be made the unique winner by
deleting C1 ∪ C2).
Step 3: If ‖C1 ∪C2‖ > k+1 then reject and halt (to ensure that c is the unique winner, it
is necessary (but not sufficient) to delete all candidates in C1 and all but one of the
candidates in C2).
Step 4: If ‖C1 ∪ C2‖ = k + 1 then for each d ∈ C2, consider the election with candidates
(C − (C1 ∪ C2)) ∪ {d} and voters V . If c wins this election (i.e., is in first or second
position for each voter), then accept and halt.
Step 5: If none of the iterations of the for-each loop in Step 4 was successful, then reject
and halt.
It remains to prove that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by deleting
candidates. Susceptibility follows from Theorem 3.1. To show NP-hardness, we provide
a ≤pm-reduction from the standard NP-complete problem Vertex Cover (see Garey and
Johnson [56]), which is defined as follows:
Vertex Cover
Given: An undirected, simple graph G and a positive integer k.
Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size at most k, i.e., does there exist a subset V ′
of G’s vertex set such that ‖V ′‖ ≤ k and V ′ contains at least one vertex of each edge
in G?
Given an instance (G, k) of Vertex Cover, create an instance (C, 0, V, k) of Constructive
Control by Deleting Candidates for election system hybrid(E0, E1) as follows. Let G have n
vertices and m edges. Without loss of generality, let the vertices of G be 2, 4, . . . , 2n. The
candidate set is defined by C = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n}, where 0 is the distinguished candidate,
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1 is the candidate whose presence determines whether hybrid routes its input to E0 or E1,
and 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n are candidates corresponding to the vertices of G. The voters in V are
defined as follows:
1. The first voter has preference 0 > · · · ,
2. the second voter has preference 1 > 0 > · · · , and
3. there are m additional voters, corresponding to the edges of G: For every edge {i, j}
in G with i < j, we add a voter with preference i > j > 0 > · · · .
In all the above preferences, the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order.
Clearly, this transformation is polynomial-time computable. To show that Vertex Cover
≤pm-reduces to Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates for hybrid(E0, E1), we prove
the following claim.
Claim A.1 G has a vertex cover of size ≤ k (k ≤ n) if and only if candidate 0 can be
made the unique winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by deleting
at most k candidates.
Proof of Claim A.1. From left to right: Delete the candidates corresponding to a vertex
cover of G. Since candidate 1 has not been deleted, hybrid(E0, E1) routes its input to the
system Edefault = E1. Thus, candidate 0 is the unique winner.
From right to left: If candidate 0 is the unique winner after at most k candidates have
been deleted, candidate 1 cannot be among the deleted candidates. (Note that otherwise
hybrid(E0, E1) would have routed its input to the system E0, and since after deleting at
most k ≤ n candidates at least two candidates remain, no one would have won in E0.) Since
candidate 1 is ranked first by the second voter, it follows that candidate 0 must be ranked
first or second by all voters. This means that the set of deleted candidates corresponds to
a vertex cover of G having size at most k. ❑ Claim A.1
This completes the proof. ❑ Theorem 3.23
Proof of Theorem 3.26. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.21. In all eight
cases, it follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 that hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is suscepti-
ble to Φ. Since P = NP and the winner problem in each of Case 1a through 1d and the
unique winner problem in each of Case 2a through 2d for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1) is in the
polynomial hierarchy, we have a polynomial-time algorithm for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s
winner problem in each of Case 1a through 1d and a polynomial-time algorithm for
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s unique winner problem in each of Case 2a through 2d.
To prove vulnerability to the given control type Φ, nondeterministically guess every
possible way of partitioning the candidate set and use the polynomial-time algorithm for
hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s winner problem if ties in subelections are handled by TP and use
the polynomial-time algorithm for hybrid(E0, E1, . . . , Ek−1)’s unique winner problem if ties
in subelections are handled by TE to determine which candidates participate in the final
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round of the election. Then use a polynomial-time algorithm for the unique winner problem
(note that when a winner problem is in P, that clearly implies that the corresponding unique
winner problem is in P) to determine if the distinguished candidate is the unique winner
of the (final round of the) election for constructive control cases, and if the distinguished
candidate is not a unique winner of the (final round of the) election for destructive control
cases. ❑ Theorem 3.26
Proof of Theorem 3.28. Let E0 be the election system in which each candidate c is a
winner if and only if c is the only candidate and there is only one voter. This artificial elec-
tion system is clearly vulnerable to constructive control by run-off partition of candidates.
To define E1, we modify election system E1 from the proof of Theorem 3.23. Here, we define
E1 to be the following artificial election system: For each candidate c ∈ C, c wins election
(C, V ) if and only if
1. for some integer n ≥ 0, ‖V ‖ = 1 + n(n− 1)/2 and ‖C‖ ≤ (n+ 3)/2, and
2. c is ranked first by the first voter in V and c is ranked first or second by all voters.
It is immediate that E0 and E1 are candidate-anonymous. Note that tie-handling issues
do not apply, since E0 and E1 never have ties. It is easy to see that E1 is susceptible to
constructive control by run-off partition of candidates. We now describe a polynomial-time
algorithm to decide if this type of control can be asserted.
Given an instance (C, c, V ) of Constructive Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates,
first check that for some integer n ≥ 0, ‖V ‖ = 1 + n(n − 1)/2. If not, for no partition of
candidates is c the unique winner.
If ‖V ‖ = 1+ n(n− 1)/2 for some integer n ≥ 0, we claim that c is the unique winner in
partition ({c}, C − {c}) if and only if there is a candidate partition (C1, C2) in which c is
the unique winner. This proves that E1’s control problem is in P, since checking if c is the
unique winner in ({c}, C − {c}) can be done in polynomial time.
To prove the nontrivial direction of our claim, suppose that c is the unique winner in par-
tition (C1, C2) where c ∈ C1, but that c is not the unique winner in partition ({c}, C − {c}).
Since c is the unique winner of ({c}, V ), there is a candidate d ∈ C −{c} such that d is the
unique winner of (C − {c}, V ) and such that c is not the unique winner of ({c, d}, V ). It
follows that d is ranked first by the first voter. If d ∈ C1, then c is not the unique winner of
(C1, V ), which contradicts the assumption that c is the unique winner in partition (C1, C2).
If d ∈ C2, then d is the unique winner of (C2, V ) (since C2 ⊆ C − {c} and d is the unique
winner of (C − {c}, V )). It follows that the final run-off is ({c, d}, V ). Since d is ranked
first by the first voter, c does not win the final run-off, contradicting the assumption that
c is the unique winner in partition (C1, C2).
It remains to prove that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by run-off
partition of candidates. Susceptibility follows from Theorem 3.1. To show NP-hardness
of the control problem, we provide a reduction from the problem Odd Half Vertex Cover,
which is a minor modification of Vertex Cover and is defined as follows:
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Odd Half Vertex Cover
Given: An undirected, simple graph G with an odd number n > 1 of vertices.
Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size (n+ 1)/2?
Standard padding can be used to show that Odd Half Vertex Cover is NP-hard (see, for
example, [60, Problem 7.22]). The reduction from Odd Half Vertex Cover to Construc-
tive Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates is similar to the reduction from Vertex
Cover to Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates, which was presented in the proof
of Theorem 3.23.
Given an instance G of Odd Half Vertex Cover, create an instance (C, 0, V ) of Con-
structive Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates for election system hybrid(E0, E1) as
follows. Let G have n > 1 vertices, n odd. Without loss of generality, let the vertices of
G be 2, 4, . . . , 2n. The candidate set is defined by C = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 2n}, where 0
is the distinguished candidate, 1 and 3 are candidates whose presence determines whether
hybrid routes its input to E0 or E1, and 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n are candidates corresponding to the
vertices of G. The 1 + n(n− 1)/2 voters in V are defined as follows:
1. The first voter has preference 0 > 3 > · · · ,
2. for every edge {i, j} in G with i < j, we add a voter with preference 3 > i > j > 0 >
· · · , and
3. add duplicates of the first voter until there are exactly 1 + n(n− 1)/2 voters.
In the above preferences, the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order. Clearly,
this transformation is polynomial-time computable. To show that Odd Half Vertex Cover
≤pm-reduces to Constructive Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates for hybrid(E0, E1),
we prove the following claim.
Claim A.2 G has a vertex cover of size (n+1)/2 if and only if candidate 0 can be made the
unique winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by run-off partition
of candidates.
Proof of Claim A.2. From left to right: Let C ′ ⊆ {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n} be a vertex cover of
G of size (n + 1)/2. Consider candidate partition C2 = {3} ∪ C
′ and C1 = C − C2. Note
that ‖C1‖ = ‖C2‖ = (n + 3)/2. Also note that both subelections are routed to E1. It is
immediate that 3 is the unique winner of (C2, V ). Since C
′ is a vertex cover of G, 0 is the
unique winner of (C1, V ). It is immediate that 0 is the unique winner of the final run-off
({0, 3}, V ).
From right to left: Suppose 0 is the unique winner in partition (C1, C2) where 0 ∈ C1.
Then subelection (C1, V ) and the final run-off need to involve candidates from {1, 3} (since
‖V ‖ 6= 1, subelections routed to E0 will not have winners). It follows that 0 is the unique
winner of (C1, V ), that 1 or 3 is the unique winner of (C2, V ), and that exactly one of 1 or 3 is
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in C1. Since both subelections have unique winners, it follows that ‖C1‖ = ‖C2‖ = (n+3)/2.
Since 0 is the unique winner of (C1, V ), the vertex candidates that are not in C1 (i.e., that
are in C2) form a vertex cover of G. C2 contains exactly (n + 3)/2 − 1 = (n + 1)/2 vertex
candidates. So, G has a vertex cover of size (n+ 1)/2. ❑ Claim A.2
This completes the proof. ❑ Theorem 3.28
Proof of Theorem 3.32. As in the proof of Theorem 3.28, let E0 be the election system
in which each candidate c is a winner if and only if c is the only candidate and there is
only one voter. This artificial election system is clearly vulnerable to constructive control
by partition of candidates. To define E1, we modify election system E1 from the proof of
Theorem 3.28. Here, we define E1 to be the following artificial election system: For each
candidate c ∈ C, c wins election (C, V ) if and only if
1. for some even integer n ≥ 0, ‖V ‖ = 1 + n(n− 1)/2 and ‖C‖ ∈ {1, n/2 + 2}, and
2. c is ranked first by the first voter in V and c is ranked first or second by all voters.
It is immediate that E0 and E1 are candidate-anonymous. Note that tie-handling issues
do not apply, since E0 and E1 never have ties. It is easy to see that E1 is susceptible
to constructive control by partition of candidates. We now describe a polynomial-time
algorithm to decide if this type of control can be asserted for E1.
Given an instance (C, c, V ) of Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates, first
check that for some even integer n ≥ 0, ‖V ‖ = 1 + n(n − 1)/2. If not, for no partition of
candidates is c the unique winner.
If ‖V ‖ = 1+n(n−1)/2 for some even integer n ≥ 0, first check if c is the unique winner
in partition (C − {c}, {c}). Now suppose that c is not the unique winner in this partition.
Since c is the unique winner of ({c}, V ), it follows that (C − {c}, V ) has a winner, which
implies that ‖C − {c}‖ ∈ {1, n/2 + 2}, i.e., ‖C‖ ∈ {2, n/2 + 3}.
Note that if c is the unique winner in partition (C1, C2), one of the following cases holds:
1. c ∈ C1 and ‖C1‖ ∈ {1, n/2 + 2},
2. c ∈ C2 and ‖C2‖ ∈ {1, n/2 + 2}, or
3. c ∈ C2 and ‖C2‖ = n/2 + 1.
Since ‖C‖ ∈ {2, n/2 +3}, we can enumerate all partitions (C1, C2) that satisfy one of these
cases in polynomial time. Control can be asserted if and only if c is the unique winner for
one of these partitions.
It remains to prove that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to constructive control by partition of
candidates. Susceptibility follows from Theorem 3.1. To show NP-hardness of the control
problem, we provide a reduction from the NP-complete problem Even Half Vertex Cover,
a minor variation of the problem Odd Half Vertex Cover that was used in the proof of
Theorem 3.28.
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Even Half Vertex Cover
Given: An undirected, simple graph G with an even number n > 0 of vertices.
Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size n/2?
The reduction from Even Half Vertex Cover to Constructive Control by Partition of Can-
didates is similar to the reduction from Odd Half Vertex Cover to Constructive Control by
Run-off Partition Candidates, which was presented in the proof of Theorem 3.28.
Given an instance G of Even Half Vertex Cover, create an instance (C, 0, V ) of Con-
structive Control by Partition of Candidates for election system hybrid(E0, E1) as follows.
Let G have n > 0 vertices, n even. Without loss of generality, let the vertices of G be
2, 4, . . . , 2n. The candidate set is defined by C = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 2n}, where 0 is the dis-
tinguished candidate, 1 is the candidate whose presence determines whether hybrid routes
its input to E0 or E1, and 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n are candidates corresponding to the vertices of G.
The 1 + n(n− 1)/2 voters in V are defined as follows:
1. The first voter has preference 0 > 1 > · · · ,
2. for every edge {i, j} in G with i < j, we add a voter with preference i > j > 0 > · · · ,
and
3. add duplicates of the first voter until there are exactly 1 + n(n− 1)/2 voters.
In the above preferences, the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order. Clearly,
this transformation is polynomial-time computable. To show that Even Half Vertex Cover
≤pm-reduces to Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates for hybrid(E0, E1), we prove
the following claim.
Claim A.3 G has a vertex cover of size n/2 if and only if candidate 0 can be made the
unique winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by partition of can-
didates.
Proof of Claim A.3. From left to right: Let C ′ ⊆ {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n} be a vertex cover of
G of size n/2. Consider candidate partition C1 = C
′ and C2 = C − C1. Note that (C1, V )
has no winners, since hybrid routes this election to E0. Since C
′ is a vertex cover of G and
‖C2‖ = n/2 + 2, 0 is the unique winner of (C2, V ), and thus of the whole election.
From right to left: Suppose 0 is the unique winner in partition (C1, C2). Then certainly
0 is the unique winner of some subelection. Note that n > 0 and n is even implies ‖V ‖ > 1.
So, in order for 0 to win a subelection, the subelection must be routed to E1, which implies
that 1 participates in the subelection. But this implies that the number of candidates
involved in the subelection is n/2+2 and 0 is ranked first or second by all voters. It follows
that the set of candidates not involved in the subelection form a vertex cover of G, and this
vertex cover is of size n/2. ❑ Claim A.3
This completes the proof. ❑ Theorem 3.32
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Proof of Theorem 3.36. In E0, each candidate c wins if and only if there is at least
one voter and c is ranked first by the first voter and (there are at least two voters or there
are at least two candidates). This artificial system is clearly candidate-anonymous and it
is easy to see that E0 is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates, partition
of candidates (in models TE and TP), and run-off partition of candidates (in models TE
and TP): Consider an election with two candidates, c and d, and one voter, c > d. Then c
is the unique winner of the election, but deleting d or partitioning {c, d} into {c} and {d}
will ensure that c does not win. To show vulnerability, note that distinguished candidate c
can be made not a unique winner of (C, V ) if and only if ‖V ‖ = 0 or c is not ranked first
by the first voter or ‖V ‖ = 1 (in the latter case by deleting all candidates other than c, or
by partitioning the set of candidates C into C1 = {c} and C2 = C − {c}).
In E1, for each candidate c ∈ C, c wins election (C, V ) if and only if ‖V ‖ > 0 and c
is ranked second by the first voter and (‖V ‖ 6= 4‖C‖2 or some voter ranks c worse than
second).
It is immediate that E1 is candidate-anonymous. Note that tie-handling issues do not
apply, since E0 and E1 never have ties. It is easy to see that E1 is susceptible to destructive
control by deleting candidates, partition of candidates, and run-off partition of candidates.
To show vulnerability, it suffices to show that we can decide in polynomial time whether
these types of control can be asserted.
Given an instance (C, c, V, k) of Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates, control
can be asserted if and only if
1. ‖V ‖ = 0, or
2. c is not ranked second by the first voter, or
3. ‖V ‖ = 4‖C‖2 and no voter ranks c worse than second, or
4. k > 0.
Note that if any of the first three cases holds, c does not win, so no action by the chair is
required to assert control. On the other hand, if none of these first three cases holds, the
chair can block c from winning exactly if k > 0, by deleting one candidate to make sure
that c is not ranked second by the first voter.
Given an instance (C, c, V ) of Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates or of
Destructive Control by Run-off Partition of Candidates, note that c is not a winner in
election ({c}, V ). Thus, these two types of destructive control can always be asserted, using
partition ({c}, C − {c}).
It remains to prove that hybrid(E0, E1) is resistant to destructive control by by deleting
candidates, partition of candidates, and run-off partition of candidates.
Susceptibility follows from Theorem 3.1. To show NP-hardness of the control problem,
we provide a reduction from the NP-complete problem Even Half Vertex Cover, which was
defined in the proof of Theorem 3.32. The reduction is similar to the reduction from Even
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Half Vertex Cover to Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates from the proof of
Theorem 3.32.
Given an instance G of Even Half Vertex Cover, create an instance of the relevant de-
structive control problem for election system hybrid(E0, E1) as follows. Let G have n > 0
vertices, n even. Without loss of generality, let the vertices of G be {2, 4, . . . , 2n}. The can-
didate set is defined by C = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 2n}, where 0 is the distinguished candidate,
1 is the candidate whose presence determines whether hybrid routes its input to E0 or E1,
and 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n are candidates corresponding to the vertices of G. The 4(n/2+2)2 voters
V are defined as follows:
1. The first voter has preference 1 > 0 > · · · ,
2. for every edge {i, j} in G with i < j, we add a voter with preference i > j > 0 > · · · ,
and
3. add duplicates of the first voter until there are exactly (n+ 4)2 = 4(n/2 + 2)2 voters.
In the above preferences, the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary order. Clearly,
this transformation is polynomial-time computable. To show that Even Half Vertex Cover
≤pm-reduces to Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates, Partition of Candidates, and
Run-off Partition of Candidates for hybrid(E0, E1), it suffices to prove the following claim.
Claim A.4 1. G has a vertex cover of size n/2 if and only if candidate 0 can be made
not a unique winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by deleting
at most n/2 candidates.
2. G has a vertex cover of size n/2 if and only if candidate 0 can be made not a unique
winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by partition of candi-
dates.
3. G has a vertex cover of size n/2 if and only if candidate 0 can be made not a unique
winner of election (C, V ) with respect to system hybrid(E0, E1) by run-off partition of
candidates.
Proof of Claim A.4. From left to right (for all three cases): Let C ′ ⊆ {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2n}
be a vertex cover of G of size n/2. Consider election (C−C ′, V ). Since ‖V ‖ = 4(n/2+2)2 =
4‖C − C ′‖2 and 0 is ranked first or second by all voters in (C − C ′, V ), it follows that 0
is not a winner of (C − C ′, V ). Thus, destructive control can be asserted by deleting the
n/2 candidates in C ′ in the deleting candidates case, and by partitioning the candidates as
(C − C ′, C ′) in the partition and run-off partition of candidates cases.
From right to left (for all three cases): Suppose 0 can be made not a unique winner of
election (C, V ) by deleting candidates, or by partition of candidates, or by run-off partition
of candidates. Then it certainly follows that for some C ′ ⊆ C with 0 ∈ C ′, 0 is not a winner
of (C ′, V ). Note that candidate 1 must participate in election (C ′, V ), since 0 is the unique
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winner of all subelections that don’t involve 1: such elections are routed to E0, ‖V ‖ ≥ 2,
and the first voter ranks 0 first of the candidates in C − {1}.
So, 0 is not a winner of (C ′, V ) for some C ′ such that {0, 1} ⊆ C ′ ⊆ C. Since (C ′, V ) is
routed to E1 and 0 is ranked second by the first voter in (C
′, V ), it follows that ‖V ‖ = 4‖C ′‖2
and that 0 is ranked first or second by all voters. The latter condition implies that the set
of candidates not involved in the subelection, i.e., the candidates in C − C ′, form a vertex
cover of G. Since ‖V ‖ = 4(n/2 + 2)2 and ‖V ‖ = 4‖C ′‖2, it follows that ‖C ′‖ = n/2 + 2,
and thus the vertex cover of G, C − C ′, has size n/2. ❑ Claim A.4
This completes the proof. ❑ Theorem 3.36
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